Défense nationale National Defence

UNCLASSIFIED

CANADA'S COMMITMENT TO NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK: THE NORTHERN BASE OPTION

by

William Scot Robertson

ORAE EXTRA-MURAL PAPER NO. 27

ORAE

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

OTTAWA

Canada

UNCLASSIFIED

DECEMBER 1983

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

CANADA

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

ORAE EXTRA-MURAL PAPER NO. 27

CANADA'S COMMITMENT TO NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK: THE NORTHERN BASE OPTION

by

WILLIAM SCOT ROBERTSON

An Extra-Mural Paper presents the view of its author on a topic of potential interest to DND. Publication by ORAE confirms the interest but does not necessarily imply endorsement of the paper's content or agreement with its conclusions. It is issued for information purposes and to stimulate discussion.

OTTAWA, CANADA DECEMBER 1983

ABSTRACT

The security of NATO's Northern Flank has posed particular problems for the Western Alliance. Norway's cautious position within the Alliance has made it increasingly difficult for NATO to ensure the integrity of this vital region in the face of the enhanced Soviet military threat. If the Soviet Union is able to turn NATO's Northern Flank and interdict the North Atlantic sea lanes of communication which NATO must use to transport reserves of manpower and equipment to Europe, NATO may be placed in an extremely difficult position.

Canada has, since 1964 and particularly since 1977, maintained a commitment to provide forces to act as a deterrent along the Northern Flank. Should deterrence fail, these Canadian forces are supposed to assist in defending the Northern Flank. Canada's capability to live up to this commitment is now in grave doubt. In response to this doubt, various defence analysts in Canada have suggested alternatives which may allow Canada to more effectively fulfill this commitment.

One group of analysts has recommended the establishment of a northern base in the Canadian Arctic for the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group (CAST). An alternative proposal envisages a CAST base in northern Europe. Neither option is as credible as a base in Norway should this possibility become acceptable to a Norwegian Government.

RÉSUMÉ

La sécurité du Flanc nord de l'OTAN a posé des problèmes particuliers à l'Alliance atlantique. La position prudente de la Norvège au sein de l'Alliance rend de plus en plus difficile la tâche de l'OTAN d'assurer l'intégrité de cette région vitale, devant la menace militaire croissante de la part des Soviétiques. Si l'Union soviétique était capable de s'emparer du Flanc nord de l'OTAN et bloquait les voies maritimes de l'Atlantique Nord que l'OTAN doit emprunter pour transporter des réserves de main-d'oeuvre et d'équipement en Europe, l'OTAN pourrait se trouver dans une position extrêmement difficile.

Depuis 1964, et surtout depuis 1977, le Canada maintient un engagement à fournir des forces pour servir à la dissuasion sur le Flanc nord. Si cette dissuasion échouait, ces forces canadiennes devraient contribuer à la défense du Flanc nord. La capacité du Canada à remplir cet engagement est maintenant très douteuse. En réaction à ce doute, différents analystes de la défense au Canada ont suggéré des solutions qui pourraient permettre au Canada de mieux remplir son engagement.

L'un de ces groupes d'analystes a recommandé l'établissement d'une base nordique dans l'Arctique canadien pour le Groupe brigade canadien transportable par air/mer (CAST). Une autre solution serait la création d'une base CAST dans le nord de l'Europe. Aucune de ces options ne semble aussi valable qu'une base en Norvège, si le Gouvernement norvégien juge cette possibilité acceptable.

PREFACE

Canada's commitment to the security of NATO's Northern Flank is an important, but by and large misunderstood, aspect of Canadian defence policy. In the recent past, questions have been raised regarding the viability of this commitment. As a result of these questions, alternate means to fulfill this commitment have been suggested. These alternatives involving a Northern Base Option have been the focus of some debate and discussion, unfortunately however, the debate has tended to be carried on in something of a vacuum. This thesis attempts to draw together the alternatives, discuss them in detail and come to some conclusions about the viability of the Northern Base Option. In a modest way it is hoped that this thesis will make a contribution to the debate on this important aspect of Canadian defence policy.

First and foremost, warm appreciation is extended to Professor William Dobell without whom which this study would never have been completed. He patiently endured my penchant for procrastination, tamed my excesses and provided many insightful comments and criticisms. Thanks must also go out to Nils Ørvik for planting the seed for this study, John McDougall, Jack Hyatt and Peter Neary for their endless encouragement and finally to my parents for their constant support. To these people I will be eternally grateful.

FOREWORD

The following report was originally produced as a graduate thesis in Political Science for the University of Western Ontario. It has been edited and revised for its present publication. ORAE regards this report as an original and interesting contribution to the ongoing debate on northern security and defence options, and is therefore distributing it in the series of Extra-Mural Papers for the benefit of its regular readership.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
ABSTRACT		i
RESUME		ii
PREFACE		iii
FOREWORD		iv
INTRODUCTION		1
CHAPTER		
I	THE SOVIET THREAT TO NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK	4
II	THE VIABILITY OF CANADA'S PRESENT COMMITMENT TO NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK	26
III	THE NORTHERN BASE OPTION: CANADA	46
IV	THE NORTHERN BASE OPTION: EUROPE	76
V	CONCLUSION	94
BIBLIOGRAPHY		103

INTRODUCTION

In Canada and War, Desmond Morton notes that "Canadians have been fond of describing themselves as an 'unmilitary people' living in 'the peaceable kingdom'."[1] When one considers that much of Canadian history has been profoundly influenced by war and by things military, it is somewhat surprising that this sentiment still prevails. Despite this popular perception, successive Canadian governments during the post World War II period have recognized that Canada is not in a position to defend itself and as such have viewed collective defence arrangements like NATO as the only course available. While NATO has been one of the central pillars of Canadian defence policy during this period, the path has not always been a smooth one.

Canadian participation in NATO has sometimes been questioned, particularly the involvement in Europe through the stationing of Canadian forces there. During the middle and later 1950s, the Canadian presence in Europe was relatively unquestioned. The weakness of the European members coupled with the looming Soviet threat necessitated a strong Canadian presence. However, as the Europeans began to recover there was occasional doubt in Canada as to why it

---

[1] Desmond Morton, Canada and War (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), p. 1.

should station forces in Europe when Canada had so much of its own geography to defend.

One part of Canada's contribution to the defence of Europe involves a commitment to defend NATO's Northern Flank. Although it is an important commitment, it has been overshadowed by the more highly visible involvement along the Central Front. The 1964 defence White Paper, as a result of the desire to avoid a nuclear role in Europe, gave birth to a vague commitment to the security of the Northern Flank. Despite the problems caused by the Norwegian policy banning foreign bases or nuclear weapons from Norwegian territory, Canada took up what was to become an important but exceedingly problematic commitment. The White Paper, Defence in the Seventies, with its cuts in the size of the Canadian forces based in Europe, would lead to further problems in fulfilling this commitment. In an attempt to assuage negative European reaction to the force cuts, the government established the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group (CAST Group) in order to improve the viability of the commitment. The CAST Group, based in Canada, is intended for rapid reinforcement of the Northern Flank in a crisis situation prior to any hostilities. While this may have been just possible during the early seventies, the changing nature of the Soviet threat to this region makes it a highly questionable commitment today.

The Senate Subcommittee on National Defence, established in 1980 to examine Canada's defence policy and its preparedness, focused considerable attention on the commitment of the CAST Group to the Northern Flank. Testimony from several witnesses before the Subcommittee revealed concern about the military viability of the CAST

Group.[2] Doubts were also expressed about whether the CAST Group would reach Norway in time or intact. The Subcommittee recognized the importance of the CAST Group from an Alliance perspective but expressed concern about whether the present commitment makes "the best use of Canada's limited military manpower and resources."[3]

This study will examine whether the new and enhanced Soviet threat to NATO's Northern Flank is becoming increasingly problematic for NATO plans and policies, and whether the present Canadian commitment of the CAST Group is still tenable. Following this, the study will examine the Northern Base option first as applied to the Canadian Arctic and secondly as applied to Northern Europe. The conclusion will assess whether Canada's commitment to NATO's Northern Flank is viable or indeed whether it can be made viable.

---

[2]Canada, Senate, Subcommittee on National Defence, First Report (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1982), p. 19.

[3]Ibid., p. 20.

CHAPTER I

THE SOVIET THREAT TO NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK

> If our northern flank should be turned, America's access to Europe would be exposed and thus her ability to aid us would be curtailed. NATO's northern Flank is an area whose importance is growing....Its defense is vital to the very survival of the West as a whole.[1]

The significance of NATO's Northern Flank to the security of the Alliance as a whole is a factor which is often overlooked, due primarily to the preponderance of attention which is focused upon the more highly visible Central Front. If General Walker's assessment of the importance of the Northern Flank to the Western Alliance quoted above is correct, then those who are concerned with Alliance policies and priorities would do well to examine what some analysts have suggested is a rapidly deteriorating situation along the Northern Flank.[2] Having said this, however, it is first necessary to embark upon a brief general discussion of the problem of threat assessment prior to a more in-depth analysis of the present situation along NATO's Northern Flank.

---

[1] General Sir Walter Walker, cited in M. K. Leighton, The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank (New York: National Strategy Information Centre, 1979), p. 1.

[2] See, for example, K. A. Myers, "North Atlantic Security: The Forgotten Flank?," The Washington Papers, Vol. 6, No. 62 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979) or M. K. Leighton, The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank (New York: National Strategy Information Centre, 1979).

The question of whether, in fact, a threat to NATO and its member states actually exists, has long cast a shadow over Alliance policies and preparations designed to meet the perceived threat. [3] At the simplest level, this question of threat assessment has resulted in a debate between those who believe that there is indeed a threat to NATO and those who assert that no such threat exists. Clearly, the Soviet Union possesses the ability to adopt a wide range of military options. The crux of the problem however, is to distinguish what is probable from the broader range of possibilities. This poses a dilemma for anyone who attempts to indulge in identifying and measuring the perceived threat. Recognizing that this dilemma creates an obstacle for the strategic analyst, the question which arises is how these obstacles can be surmounted in order to develop a plausible, factually sound assessment of the threat. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Peter Hill-Norton has provided one possible, although not altogether satisfactory solution to this dilemma. [4] Hill-Norton states that

> It must at once be said that it is impossible to prove that there is such a threat, although reasonable men can make acceptable deductions from observed facts... and it is of course equally impossible to prove that there is no threat at all; but it is certainly less easy, and indeed

---

[3] For a brief discussion of the problem of identifying the threat, see Sir Peter Hill-Norton, No Soft Options: The Politico-Military Realities of NATO (London: Hurst, 1978), pp. 16-21.

[4] Hill-Norton's solution is not entirely satisfactory in that he ignores the problems of perception and rationality which are constant problems in the field of strategic analysis. See, John Bayliss et al., Contemporary Strategy (London: Croom Helm, 1975)

> could be judged impossible, acceptably to deduce this from the same observed facts. [5]

By following Hill-Norton's line of reasoning, the strategic analyst can make reasonable deductions about an adversary's intentions through a careful observation of the facts. While this approach does not fully answer the dilemma of possibilities versus probabilities, it does allow one to make certain careful assumptions. It is to this end that the next section of this chapter will trace the build-up of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces along the Northern Flank and attempt to extrapolate from this, Soviet intentions, and consequently, the Soviet threat in this region.

Prior to embarking on a detailed discussion of the build-up of Soviet forces along the Northern Flank, it is first necessary to examine briefly the historical importance of this region to the Soviet Union and the subsequent strategic emphasis devoted to it. As John Erickson has noted,

> (t)he Soviet Union, like its imperial predecessor, has expended much blood in an effort to entrench itself through the key 'core area' covering Leningrad and the northwestern approaches of the U.S.S.R. [6]

One need not cast ones eyes too far back in history to find examples of the importance of Northwestern Europe to Soviet security and strategic objectives. Throughout the 1918 - 1920 Russian Civil War, the Allied intervention in support of the "Whites" starkly highlighted the strategic significance

---

[5]Hill-Norton, op. cit., p. 16.

[6]John Erickson, "The Northern Theatre: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," Strategic Review, Summer 1976, p. 67.

of this region. Control of this region by a hostile power could seriously threaten not only Soviet maritime supply lines, but also her territorial integrity in the vital Leningrad region. According to Nils Ørvik,

> (t)he Allied, 'white' intervention in 1918-1920 became a new reminder of the growing strategic significance of the Northern Cap... and must have been foremost in Stalin's mind in 1939 when he obtained Hitler's consent to include Finland in the Soviet sphere of influence. [8]

The strategic significance of the Northern Cap was further illustrated for the Soviet Union from 1941-1944, a period during which the Germans dominated the region.

> The Germans... gave the Russians an illustrative lesson on the consequences of having this area controlled by a hostile power. The threat was not limited to the key positions of Murmansk and Leningrad. Of no less importance were the blows launched from ports in North Norway, which the Germans developed into a vital base area for their maritime operations in both the North Atlantic and South Atlantic. Control of the Norwegian coast must have seemed just as important to the Russian war effort as control in the interior of the Cap. [9]

As the combined weight of the Allies began to turn the tide against Germany, the Soviet Union made limited advances into the Northern Cap and along the Norwegian coast-line, halted, and consolidated their gains. [10] During the summer of 1945, the

---

[7] For a brief historical discussion of the significance of this region, see N. Ørvik, "Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union", Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 6, Sept. 1963 (Cambridge, Mass.: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1963), pp. 18-22.

[8] Ibid., p. 19.

[9] Ibid., p. 20.

[10] Ibid., pp. 20-22. There is speculation that the Soviet Union did not possess the wherewithal to advance any further.

Soviets withdrew from the region laying the groundwork for the post-war competition along the Northern Flank.

With the Soviet Union either unable or unwilling to assert control over the Northern Flank other than Finland, and perhaps pre-occupied with consolidating its territorial gains in Eastern Europe, the period 1945-48 was one or relative military stability in Northern Europe. The principal Soviet concern in the region was to ensure that Finland never again would provide a corridor for an attack on the Soviet Union. To this end, the Soviet Union and Finland signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance in April of 1948, under which the Soviet Union and Finland had common responsibility to prevent Finland becoming a base for an attack on the Soviet Union. [11]

During that same period, the other Scandinavian countries, Norway, Sweden, and to a lesser extent Denmark, "returned to their pre-war policy of 'bridge-building'... many in Norway felt that she had a special duty to act as a mediator between East and West." [12] This situation, from the Soviet perspective, although not ideal, was more than acceptable. With Norway, Sweden and Denmark pursuing the traditional Scandinavian neutrality, and Finland clearly entrenched in the Soviet sphere of influence, the northern area became something of a no-man's land between East and West. The desire that

---

There is also speculation that the United States and British interests in the region precluded a permanent Soviet occupation.

[11] The treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union is discussed in M. Jakobsen, Finnish Neutrality (London: Hugh Evelyn, 1968)

[12] Orvik, op. cit., p. 24.

this situation should persist in the north would, however, become an unfulfilled desire. Events in 1948 and 1949 prompted Norway and Denmark to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Sweden adopted its policy of armed neutrality.

At the risk of over-simplifying, NATO was born

> ...out of a mixture of fear and necessity. There was fear because of the power vacuum created to the east and west of the Soviet Union...and a clear perception that this vacuum was being filled already by the combined strength of the Red Army and world Communism. In the judgement of the new Allies, there was a perceived danger that this combination was already embarked on an expansionist policy....The necessity arose simply because it was totally clear that none of the Western powers could attempt to match military strength of this order alone.[13]

In the period immediately prior to Norway and Denmark formally joining the Atlantic Alliance, Soviet reaction to such an eventuality was sharp to say the least. From the Soviet perspective, the prospect of a military alliance including Norway and Denmark was seen to pose a potentially serious threat to Soviet national security in the region of the North Sea Routes and the Danish Belts. It is perhaps understandable that the Soviet Union would view this with some degree of trepidation. The Soviet Union had learned from bitter experience that these regions, in the control of a hostile power, could pose very significant threats to Soviet security. In light of this, the Soviet Union attempted, through various means short of military action, to dissuade the Scandinavian countries from joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although the attempts were to ultimately fail,

---

[13] Hill-Nor[illegible], op. cit., p. 2.

the pressure which the Soviet Union exerted in Scandinavia produced some positive results from the Soviet point of view. Both Norway and Denmark stipulated that their membership in NATO would be contingent on NATO agreeing not to establish foreign bases on their territory. NATO agreed, Norway and Denmark joined the Atlantic Alliance, and the foundation for the new Soviet threat to the Northern Flank was laid.

Nils Ørvik, in speculating on the Soviet reaction to Norwegian and Danish membership in NATO has written,

> (i)n view of what might have happened if Norway had taken the full consequences of her NATO membership, the Russians must have been relieved....Provided Norway did not change her position...the situation would not be greatly different from what it had been prior to 1949.[14]

Despite this apparent sense of relief, the Soviet Union still perceived Norwegian and Danish membership, even with the ban on foreign bases, as a potential threat to Soviet security; it therefore pursued a strategy of preventive defence. The goal of Soviet activities in the Northern Region "was not to exploit the Northern Cap themselves, but to prevent others from doing so."[15] While this may have been true during the 1950s, events of the mid-to-late 1950s resulted in the Soviet Union adopting a much more offensively oriented strategy in the region along NATO's Northern Flank. The crumbling of the American monopoly in the nuclear sphere resulted in an increased effort on the part of both the United States and the Soviet Union to improve and protect their strategic arsenals. An integral part of this effort

---

[14]Ørvik, op. cit., p. 26.

[15]Ibid., p. 26.

involved exploiting the strategic advantages of the northern territories, particularly the installation of a system of early warning devices in the northern reaches of North America and in the Soviet sector of the Northern Cap.

The United States, NATO and NORAD, it would seem, are relatively content with the network of early warning devices which they have established and maintained up to the present. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has consistently worked to build up a massive military complex in its sector of the Northern Cap, and it is the size and nature of this military build-up on the part of the Soviet Union which poses serious questions for the security of NATO's Northern Flank. In evaluating and assessing the Soviet military forces in the Northwestern theatre, John Erickson has stressed that the Soviet Union does not view this region as a flank. "To describe the northern theatre as simply a Russian and Soviet 'flank', which may well suit our terminology and useage, is perhaps to miss the whole point and thrust of the Soviet effort."[16] To further emphasize this point, Erickson states that

> (i)t is perhaps significant in its own right that of the six operational branches of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Northern is maintained as a separate entity...the Northern Theatre of operations and its several configurations goes to form an element of that theatre requiring its own special handling and planning.[17]

---

[16] Erickson, op. cit., p. 67.

[17] Ibid., pp. 67-68.

The Soviet Union, in order to support and protect what it views as a strategically vital region, has worked to "implant one of the strongest - possibly the strongest - complex of bases in the world in the immediate neighbourhood of Northern Norway."[18]

In cataloguing the nature and level of the Soviet forces in this region, it must always be borne in mind the strategic significance which the Soviets place on the North. The Soviet forces in this region represent an all-arms presence, including land, sea and air forces operating in both strategic and tactical modes. Ground forces for the Northern Theatre will be drawn from the Leningrad Military District (MD). Within the Leningrad MD there are 8 motorized rifle divisions, 1 airborne division and 1 artillery division. Of these, two motorized rifle divisions are deployed in the Kola Peninsula between the Norwegian frontier and the Murmansk Railway. The remaining divisions are deployed farther toward the hinterland. All these divisions are supported with highly mobile combat vehicles and are supported by surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles. In total then, the Soviets could call upon upwards of 119,000 ground forces for operations along the Northern Flank. [19] According to Erickson, these ground forces are "Category I... maintainig full equipment and 85% or more of their wartime establishment." [20] In addition to these permanently deployed

---

[18] Ibid., p. 68.

[19] Figures are drawn from The Military Balance 1982-1983 (London: IISS, 1982) pp. 11-17.

[20] Erickson, op. cit., p. 70.

forces, the commander of the Northern Theatre of Operations can call on additional forces including

> at least three airborne divisions, a naval infantry brigade (based at Pechenga) of 3,000-4,000 men, and so-called naval pioneers, consisting largely of demolition experts and frogmen.[21]

In the view of Norwegian officials, the Soviet ground forces along the Norwegian frontier represent perhaps the largest single concentration of military power in the world.[22] This alone is cause for concern, but when one considers that the Norwegian forces at Kirkenes along the Norwegian-Soviet frontier consist of only 500 border guards the situation takes on crisis proportions.

The Soviet air forces in the Kola Peninsula pose an equally daunting threat, being composed of 300 fighters and long-range bombers, 60 helicopters, 20 medium range transport planes and 55 maritime reconnaissance planes. In addition, the Soviet Naval Air Force of the Northern Fleet includes about 150 Tu-16s and 30 Tu-22s which operate in an anti-ship and anti-submarine role. In assessing the Soviet air power in this region, Leighton contends that the forces present have "assumed a complexion increasingly suited for offensive rather than defensive operations."[23]

The final component of the Soviet military forces in the north, the Northern Fleet represents perhaps the most formidable threat to

---

[21]Leighton, op. cit., p. 11.

[22]Drew Middleton, New York Times, June 20, 1977, p. 14.

[23]Leighton, op. cit., p. 10.

NATO's security in the Northern Region. The nature of the threat lies in the potential ability of the Northern Fleet to rupture the vital sea-lines-of-communication (SLOCs) between Europe and North America. These lines are absolutely essential if NATO is to be able to draw on the manpower and equipment reserves of the North American members of the Alliance. The Northern Fleet includes approximately 185 submarines, more than half of which are nuclear powered. According to Leighton, "this figure represents nearly 75 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s nuclear-powered ballistic missile carrying submarines (45SSBN's)."[24] As well as the powerful submarine component, the Northern Fleet includes approximately 200 surface vessels, of which 82 are major surface combatants.

Not only is the Northern Fleet the largest single unit in the Soviet Navy, it is also the most modern. The authoritative West German magazine Der Spiegel in an article of 14 August 1978 quoted Rolf Hansen, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, as stating that the Soviet Union's first aircraft carrier, the Kiev, "is the flagship of the Arctic Sea Fleet, equipped with up to 20 antisubmarine helicopters of the 'Hormone' type, and with 12 vertical take-off places of the YAK-36 type."[25] In addition, the article speculated that the sister ship to the Kiev, the Minsk, would join the Northern Fleet as would a third ship in 1985. This is expected to represent half of the Soviet aircraft carrier fleet being laid down under the present building

---

[24] Ibid., p. 9.

[25] Der Spiegel, 14 August 1978.

programme.[26] Not only does the Northern Fleet appear to have priority in acquiring the most up-to-date Soviet vessels, but the existing forces are being modernized through the replacement of guns with missile units.

It is not sufficient to merely catalogue the Soviet forces in the region, what is necessary is to attempt to identify the Soviet strategy for Northern Europe in order that a sound threat assessment and the appropriate NATO response can be formulated. In a relatively recent study of the problems of the security of NATO's Northern Flank, Kenneth Myers suggests that two main points must be made with respect to Soviet strategy in what the Soviets call the Northwestern Theatre of Military Operations (Northwest TVD).[27] "The first point is that the Soviets probably perceive these operations in the context of a general war with the NATO alliance."[28] This would appear to be a logical perception given that Alliance policies state that any attack on an individual member is considered to be an attack on the Alliance as a whole, and the Alliance will respond as such. For the Soviet Union, it is highly unlikely that they would risk an isolated attack along NATO's Northern Flank knowing that such an action could escalate into a general war. What is more likely is that the Soviet Union would launch an attack along the Northern Flank in conjunction with

---

[26] Ibid., p. 9.

[27] See Erickson, op. cit., p. 67, for an explanation of the concept of TVD (teatr voennykh deistvii).

[28] Myers, op. cit., p. 32.

hostilities in Central Europe. Myers' second point concerning Soviet objectives in this region is that

> Soviet strategy in the Northwestern Theatre is... mainly naval - that is, the prospective land campaigns in that region would be fought to insure freedom of action and uninhibited access to the open ocean for the Soviet Navy. [29]

While current Soviet strategic thinking envisages the Central Front as being the most decisive front in any major conflict with NATO, making a large scale offensive along the Northern Flank unlikely, there remains the possibility that this situation could change over time. For the time being, Soviet and Warsaw Pact activities along the Northern Flank will likely be limited to securing a few critical objectives in support of the major effort elsewhere. Captain William K. Sullivan, in a recent article in the Naval War College Review , has speculated on what the specific objectives of the Soviet Union along the Northern Flank would be. Faced with geographical constraints, the Soviet Union would likely undertake action along the Northern Flank in order to secure the following objectives:

1) obtain access to airfields, harbours, and strategic geography of Scandinavia;
2) prevent NATO's aircraft carrier forces from entering the Norwegian Sea and attacking targets in the Kola Peninsula with tactical aircraft;
3) intercept sea-lift forces resupplying allied forces in Europe;
4) protect, support, and carry out amphibious operations to other strategically important areas;
5) prevent amphibious assaults or raids against Northern Russia;
6) prevent NATO from using Scandinavian countries as forward bases for allied air and sea forces;

---

[29] Ibid., p. 32.

7) increase Soviet ballistic missile offensive and defensive capabilities.[30]

Since the objectives which Sullivan identifies as crucial to the Soviets along the Northern Flank are also vital to NATO's strategy in the Northern Region, it will be useful to examine each of these objectives individually and in some depth before proceeding. The first objective, that being to gain access to the airfields, harbours and strategic geography of the Scandinavian land-mass, is perhaps the most fundamental of all. It was pointed out above that control of the seas in this region is vital to control of the land-mass and vice versa. This fact was made abundantly clear to the Soviet Union during the Civil War of 1918-1920, and during World War II, and this lesson should not be neglected by NATO planners in their strategic assessments either. According to Sullivan, the Soviet Union has recognized this and "has gradually been extending its pattern of naval operations from the fleet base areas of the Baltic and Barents Seas to the forward defense zone of Western naval strategy in the North Atlantic, the strategic GIUK Gap."[31] In any conflict situation in the Northern Region, a vital goal is control of the eight airfields in Northern Norway.

> In Western hands, they [the airfields] threaten Soviet air support in any conflict in the vicinity of the GIUK Gap, but in Soviet hands, they could greatly extend the reach

---

[30]Captain William K. Sullivan, "Soviet Strategy and NATO's Northern Flank," Naval War College Review, Vol. VXXII, No. 4, July/August 1979, p. 29.

[31]Ibid., p. 29.

> of Russian land-based air in the Atlantic, perhaps with decisive results.[32]

The extension of Soviet land-based air power could pose s nificant difficulties for NATO in the transporting of reinforcements and supplies to Europe. From the Soviet airbases in and around Murmansk, the Backfire bomber can reach ships in the mid-Atlantic, forcing NATO to use the southern Atlantic routes for resupply. If the Soviet Union was to be able to operate the Backfire from the air bases in Northern Norway, it would be able to cover the South Atlantic approaches as well. This situation would indeed pose a serious obstacle to the reinforcement of Europe from North America.

Almost as important as the air bases are the harbours and fjords along the Norwegian coast-line. These facilities are ice-free and easily defended. Soviet control of these ports would make it exceedingly difficult for NATO to undertake operations against the Soviet naval forces in this region, or indeed to attempt any operations against the Scandinavian land-mass.

The second objective which Sullivan attributes to the Soviet Union in seeking to control the seas surrounding the Northern Region is to prevent NATO task forces from entering the Norwegian Sea and attacking targets in the Kola Peninsula. Sullivan states that "(t)he Barents Sea, via the Norwegian Sea, offers the best geographic operating area and closest point of approach for carrier forces to attack the vast complex of military and industrial targets in Northwest

---

[32]John Norris, "New Strategy for NATO's Northern Flank," Sea Power, cited in Sullivan, ibid., p. 29.

Russia."[33] In essence, Soviet control of the seas serves to protect its own Northern Sector. Evidence that the Soviets appreciate this fact can be drawn from the nature of the major Soviet naval exercises. During OKEAN 1970, and again durir OKEAN 1975, the Northern Fleet was by far the strongest element and on both occasions the exercises involved simulated attacks on hostile strike forces attempting to gain control of the seas surrounding the Northern Region.[34]

The ability to interdict the vital Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) upon which NATO strongly relies is the third objective which Sullivan identifies. In the event of a European conflict involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact, NATO depends on the ability to transport reinforcements and supplies from North America to Europe. The major transit route which NATO would utilize is a route which crosses the North Sea to the port facilities of the Benelux countries. Under circumstances where the Soviet Union was denied superiority in the Northern Region, it would still be possible for the Soviets to make limited strikes against this SLOC. However, if the Soviets were to gain control in the Northern Region, the combined air bases and port facilities may make it possible to interdict this SLOC completely. While NATO may have other options for reinforcing Europe, clearly the

---

[33] Ibid., p. 30.

[34] For a brief analysis of Soviet naval exercises in the Northern Region, see Robert G. Weinland, "The State and Future of the Soviet Navy in the North Atlantic," in C. Bertram and J. J. Holst (eds.), New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic (Guildford: IPC Press, 1977), pp. 55-73.

Northern route is the most direct and important.[35]

Assuming that the Soviets were successful in fulfilling the first three objectives outlined above, Sullivan posits a fourth objective which the Soviets would seek to secure in the Northern Region. This would be to "protect, support, and carry out amphibious operations to other strategically important areas."[36] Clearly, the Soviets would attempt to project their power farther west in an effort to gain control of the land links of the GIUK Gap. Greenland, Iceland, Faeroe Islands, Shetland Islands and the Orkney Islands represent "corks-in-the-bottle" which the Soviets must eliminate or control if they are to guarantee protection for their naval forces operating in this sector of the Atlantic. According to Sullivan, "(t)he Soviet amphibious and airborne forces are well groomed for the mission of eliminating the one definite advantage NATO now has in the north, its superior geographical position along the strategic GIUK Gap."[37]

The fifth and sixth objectives which Sullivan identifies with respect to Soviet strategy along the Northern Flank might be termed preventive. The fifth objective, according to Sullivan, would be to "prevent amphibious assaults or raids against Northern Russia."[38] Occupation of the Scandinavian land-mass and control of the contiguous

---

[35]For an in-depth analysis of the SLOC, see Sherwood S. Cordier, The Air and Sea Lanes of the North Atlantic (Washington: University Press of America, 1981).

[36]Sullivan, op. cit., p. 31.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid.

seas would provide a buffer zone for the valuable military and industrial assets in the Northern Soviet Union. The sixth objective for the Soviets would be to "prevent NATO from using Scandinavian countries as forward bases for allied air and sea forces."[39] This would preclude NATO from launching air and sea strikes against the important military and industrial targets located in northern Russia, Poland and East Germany.

Finally, the seventh and last objective might be the most important. Soviet control in the Northern Region would "increase Soviet strategic ballistic missile offensive and defensive capabilities."[40] If the Soviets were to secure control in the Northern Region, a region which is directly beneath the shortest missile route between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviets would have achieved a significant strategic advantage. Albert Romaneski in an article in Proceedings, the journal of the United States Naval Institute, has noted the strategic advantages which the Soviets would acquire as follows:

> Additional warning time, improved accuracy to targets, defensive missile screens and tracking stations, launching sites external to mother Russia, reduced missile flight distances with greater payloads and greater dispersion are among the favourable factors the Northwestern Region affords the occupying power.[41]

Having outlined at some length the strategic significance of the Northern Region, the level of Soviet forces in this region, and the

---

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.,

[41] Albert Romaneski, "Nordic Balance in the 1970's," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1973, p. 35.

potential objectives the Soviets may seek to secure, the next logical step in this examination of the enhanced Soviet threat to NATO's Northern Flank must be a speculative assessment of the tactics the Soviets may employ in order to achieve these objectives. Such an assessment is somewhat problematic. NATO is aware of the large and capable forces which the Soviet Union has available for operations in this region, and is aware of the exercise activities, yet finds it difficult to assess with confidence how these forces will be employed in a conflict situation. Robert Weinland, in an analysis of Soviet naval power in the North Atlantic, recognizes this difficulty. He attempts to overcome it by "start[ing] with those aspects about which most is known (or can be assumed with confidence) and progress[ing] from there toward the realm of pure speculation."[42] The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an attempt at assessing the general nature of Soviet tactics which may be employed in securing their strategic objectives.

In any attempt to predict or project how the Soviets will undertake operations in the Northern Region, one is confronted not only with the problem which Weinland identifies, but with a further problem of lack of agreement in Western circles as to the possible Soviet tactics. As such, and for the purposes of this study, the analysis must focus on areas where there is some degree of concensus among Western analysts.[43] There is a fairly high degree of consensus

---

[42]Weinland, op. cit., p. 65.

[43]For an indication of the divergence in opinion in Western circles, see Myers, op. cit.; Sullivan, op. cit.; and A. Maconochie,

that (1) the Soviets will undertake operations along the Northern Flank in support of operations in the strategically decisive Central Front, and (2) because of the importance of the Northern Fleet and the geographical constraints which it is faced with, operations will be designed to ensure that the Northern Fleet gains uninhibited access to the open seas. Bearing these two points in mind, it is now possible to turn to a brief discussion of the possible Soviet tactics in the Northern Region.

In most hypothetical plans of attack which Western analysts develop relating to potential Soviet operations in the Northern Region, there are three major elements: (1) the offensive against Northern Norway, (2) the Baltic Straits offensive, and (3) naval operations. The offensive directed against Northern Norway would likely involve a combined arms approach, with the first objective being seizure of the Finnmark region in order for the Soviets to neutralize radar and communications facilities which monitor Soviet air, naval, and missile activity. Naval air attacks would undoubtedly be launched at Norwegian military facilities in this region, including air bases and surveillance posts. Following the accomplishment of these initial tasks, limited amphibious landings would be carried out along the North Norwegian coast-line and Svalbard in order to secure further control in this region. According to Kenneth Myers, it is unlikely that the Soviets would "risk an attack on Narvik or farther south without first achieving naval supremacy in the Norwegian Sea."[44] Consolidation of these

---

"Across or Along: Soviet Amphibious Options in Northern Europe," United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, April 1980, pp. 46-50.

[44]Myers, op. cit., p. 33.

early gains would be achieved by a series of follow-up operations involving airborne and naval infantry forces.

The second element of Soviet activity in the Northern Region would be directed towards achieving superiority in the Baltic Sea in order that access to the Atlantic could be assured. Operations in this region would again be combined, utilizing East German and Polish forces as well. The key objective in this region is clearly, control of the Danish Straits. In order to achieve this, amphibious and airborne landings would be made on the Danish Islands which straddle the Danish Straits, and an overland thrust would be carried out northward through the Jutland Peninsula to secure a southern defence perimeter. Following these initial operations, an attempt would be made to throw a barrier across the Western Baltic to prevent NATO air and naval forces from dislodging the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.

Once the Soviets have achieved these first two objectives, they would be able to pursue vigorously what Myers contends is the "key element" in the Northern Region, a "maritime defense perimeter around the sea approaches to the Soviet Union."[45] This defence perimeter would consist of air, surface and subsurface barriers along the vital GIUK Gap to prevent NATO forces from attempting to wrest control of this region from the Soviet Union. If the Soviets were to succeed in these operations, they would be in a relatively strong position to move on in pursuit of the other strategic objectives mentioned above.[46]

---

[45] Ibid., p. 35.

[46] See p. 16 above.

Whether the Soviets are indeed capable of carrying out these operations as has been suggested, remains to be seen. What is clear is that the Soviet forces along NATO's Northern Flank are structured in such a way, and exercise for just such a contingency. This then is the new Soviet threat to NATO's Northern Flank, something which NATO planners would be well advised to take into consideration in planning to meet any Soviet aggression in this strategically vital region.

CHAPTER II

THE VIABILITY OF CANADA'S PRESENT COMMITMENT TO NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK

In light of the analysis of the "new" Soviet threat to NATO's Northern Flank, what is the state of Canada's present commitment to the security of this region? Is the Canadian commitment, in its present configuration, adequate to fulfill the objective of deterring Soviet aggression along the Northern Flank? It will be argued in this chapter that the answer to these questions must be a clear and unequivocal no. Under present conditions and circumstances, the deployment capability of the Canadian forces earmarked to reinforce the Northern Flank makes it highly unlikely that these forces will reach their designated positions in time, yet reaching their destination prior to the outbreak of hostilities was the raison d'etre for such a commitment. In an appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on National Defence, CommodoreG. L. Edwards, Director General of Military Planning and Operations of the Department of National Defence, succinctly stated the role which the ACE Mobile Force and the CAST Brigade Group are to fulfill in overall NATO planning:

> ...[A] reinforcement capability is a fundamental element of deterrence, as well as an important element of NATO's war fighting capability. The key is crisis reinforcement or, rather the alliance's manifest determination to rapidly mobilize the required resources and deploy the available

external forces early enough in a period of tension.[1]

It is the time element involved in transferring the men and resources from Canada to Northern Norway which is crucial and where the divergence between the commitment and capability is perhaps the greatest. Existing arrangements for the reinforcement of Northern Norway involve a combined air/sealift. Air transport will be drawn from Canadian military airlift resources, while the sealift will be provided by Norway using container and/or RO-RO (roll-on-roll-off) vessels.[2] According to Lt. General Jacques Chouinard (Ret'd.), "... the time expected for that organization [CAST Group] to arrive at its destination is between 21 to 30 days."[3] In view of the fact that the role of the CAST Group is to reinforce Norway in order to provide a deterrent against any Soviet moves along the Northern Flank, the length of time required to transport the CAST Group to Norway is problematic to say the least. Under these circumstances, NATO would need to have an indication that the Soviets were planning some sort of operation along the Northern Flank more than a month in advance if the CAST Group was to be called upon to fulfill its deterrent function in Norway. Recalling the analysis presented in Chapter I, it is unlikely

---

[1]Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Defence, Proceedings, Thursday, Nov. 25, 1980, p. 11.

[2]Ibid., p. 11. A bilateral memorandum of understanding between Canada and Norway makes provision for the use of Norwegian Ro-Ro vessels in a crisis.

[3]Lt. General Jacques Chouinard in an appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on National Defence, Proceedings, Tuesday, May 19, 1981, Issue No. 16, p. 7.

that NATO will have one week's warning, let alone a month or more.

The problems involved with the CAST commitment to the Northern Flank are complex and interrelated, yet for the sake of analysis they can be broken down into three somewhat distinct categories. The first category involves the question of the time available to NATO in the event of a crisis in Europe. A second category of problems might be considered political, while the third category deals with the technical problems of actually moving the Canadian based CAST Group to Northern Norway. While these problems will be dealt with in an arbitrarily distinct manner, it should be remembered that they are, in the final analysis, inextricably linked.

The notion of warning time is of vital significance to NATO in its preparations to respond to and counter Soviet moves against the Alliance. As such, the discussion of warning time is as old as NATO itself. According to Hans Goebel, the time problem "has become a standard introduction to NATO's multinational exercises."[4] Goebel then continues by sketching what has become a standard scenario for NATO exercises:

> (A)t the end of a long period of political crisis during which several international peace conferences have failed, there are indications of a Soviet force build-up. News about increasing exercise activities and leave cancellations in the Warsaw Pact countries...cause the Alliance to enhance its readiness status. After a series of futile warnings, the United States [and presumably Canada] decides to reinforce the European forces.[5]

---

[4]Hans Goebel, The Wrong Force for the Right Mission (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations NSS No. 4/81), p. 45.

[5]Ibid., p. 45.

As reinforcements from North America begin to make their way to Europe, hostilities break out as the Warsaw Pact (WP) forces launch massive thrusts along the entirety of the East-West dividing line in Europe. Adhering to the publicly announced scenario for these NATO exercises, the NATO forces, "although outnumbered...win the first battle [and] after a NATO threat to use nuclear weapons, the WP offers negotiations and considers withdrawal from NATO's territory."[6] If this is indeed an accurate appraisal of the situation, then NATO is capable of coping with the situation through its graduated alert and decision-making mechanisms. But if the situation does not unfold in this manner, and recent evidence may cast more than a shadow of doubt over the traditional view of adequate warning time, NATO may not be equipped to cope with the situation. While most of the discussion on this subject is concentrated on the problem of warning time along the Central Front, it becomes all the more crucial along the lightly defended yet strategically vital Northern Flank.

In a 1977 report to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services,[7] Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett detailed, among other things, the importance of the new Soviet conventional threat for the traditional NATO conception of adequate warning time. At this stage, it will be useful to briefly examine the Nunn-Bartlett Report as it is representative of the growing body of evidence which

---

[6] Ibid., p. 45

[7] Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Dewey F. Bartlett, NATO and the New Soviet Threat, Report to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, January 24, 1977.

indicates that NATO may not receive the warning time upon which it so heavily depends.

The central thrust of the Nunn-Bartlett Report is that during an era of perceived nuclear parity, the capability to wage a successful war below the nuclear threshold becomes increasingly important. Nunn and Bartlett contend that the Soviet drive towards nuclear parity and conventional superiority calls into question the viability of current NATO force postures in Europe, and perhaps the overall strategy of flexible response. Following this basic premise, Nunn and Bartlett turn to a more comprehensive analysis of the new Soviet threat and the implications this may have for NATO. According to Nunn and Bartlett, "(t)he New Soviet threat is a threat whose character has been deliberately retailored to exploit fully the very weaknesses in NATO's conventional posture which have always plaguec the Alliance."[8] In their view, the nature of this new Soviet threat not only challenges NATO's conventional position, but also poses difficult questions with respect to Alliance machinery for the mobilization of its forces. Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of this new threat is that the Soviets may now possess "the ability to initiate a potentially devastating attack with as little as a few days warning."[9] The danger of this development, as Nunn and Bartlett see it, is that NATO still depends on receiving adequate warning time in order to deploy its forces to the locus of the conflict as well as to mobilize and transport its reserves.

---

[8] Ibid., p. 2.

[9] Ibid., p. 4.

> For NATO the political and military implications of sharply reduced warning time are profound. They call into question whether NATO's conventional force posture is adequate to meet the new threat.[10]

While Nunn and Bartlett have dealt with the problem of warning time quite well, there is another dimension of the issue of time which they did not focus on in nearly enough depth. This other dimension is the matter of preparation time. According to Goebel, preparation time is "the time between the troops receiving the order to move out of garrison, and the outbreak of hostilities...this is the time span that really counts in terms of defence."[11] It is important that these two dimensions of time, warning time and preparation time, not be confused. Although they are part of the same equation, they are very different, and both are significant in their own right. Warning time, on the one hand, is determined mainly by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in its decision-making, while preparation time is directly related to NATO's decision-making mechanisms. In theory, it is possible that the time available to NATO for preparation may exceed the warning time which is available, through the early detection of Soviet and Warsaw Pact force build-up. For Goebel, however, preparation time can exceed warning time "only if NATO decides to act in the absence of unambiguous evidence of attack, which is very unlikely."[12] This being the case then, the NATO time equation must read like this: Warning Time minus NATO Decision-Making Time equals Preparation Time.

---

[10] Ibid., p. 6.

[11] Goebel, op. cit., p. 46.

[12] Ibid., p. 46.

If Nunn and Bartlett are correct in their assumption that the Warsaw Pact forces are capable of launching an offensive from something approximating a standing start, and Goebel is correct in his assessment of the NATO time equation, then NATO may find itself in a rather difficult and precarious situation. It must be pointed out here that most of this analysis (Nunn-Bartlett and Goebel) pertains to the Central Front, where NATO forces are well equipped and in a relative numerical balance vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. If one transposes this analytical framework onto the Northern Flank, which the Soviets perceive as strategically vital, and where there is nothing resembling a balance, then NATO may find itself faced with an almost impossible situation. This then constitutes the problem which time constraints place on NATO in general, and particularly along NATO's Northern Flank, where the rapid arrival of reinforcements (including Canadian) is considered essential if the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are to be deterred.

Turning to the second problem, the political problem which faces Canada in the fulfillment of its present commitment to NATO's Northern Flank, there are several dimensions which must be examined. The first dimension involves NATO's decision-making mechanism in a potential or actual crisis situation, something which concerns the Alliance as a whole. The second dimension is concerned with the security of NATO's Northern Flank, specifically the base and ban policy of Norway and Denmark.

For the purposes of this study, a brief outline of the problems

of the system must suffice.[13] Sir Peter Hill-Norton, in his analysis of NATO's decision-making and crisis management system, has succinctly captured the essence of the problem when he wrote:

> It is probably true that crisis management is, at one and the same time, a sort of science and a sort of art form. It is a sort of science because the tools of the trade and the methodology and technique of using them can be listed and described and a tolerable staff manual could be written on the subject....But it contains, and by its very nature always will contain, elements of an art form, because it is in the end a matter of exercising judgement....[14]

Over the years NATO has developed a complex infrastructure for decision-making. It is an infrastructure where all the facilities exist to aid in the timely making of decisions in a crisis situation. Without making any attempt to outline the nature of this infrastructure, and the procedures for arriving at rapid and positive decisions, one nagging problem or question seems to cast a shadow over the whole system, the question of political will or political determination. NATO, by its very nature as a collective defence organization composed of independent member states relies on unanimity in determining action. According to Hill-Norton,

> it is a fact that so far in its history, NATO has not had to grapple with a crisis...there have been isolated causes for alarm but none of these...involved the Alliance as a collective entity, even to the extent of ordering a Simple Alert.[15]

---

[13] For a detailed analysis of the decision-making procedures in NATO, see R. Hill, Political Consultation in NATO, Wellesley Papers 6/1978 (Toronto: CIIA, 1978). See also, Sir Peter Hill-Norton, No Soft Options: The Politico-Military Realities of NATO (London: Hurst, 1978).

[14] Hill-Norton, ibid., p. 98.

[15] Ibid., p. 103.

While Hill-Norton is willing to concede that this may be a reflection of NATO's success as a collective defence organization, he is more inclined to attribute this to a "collective reluctance to take unpalatable decisions.. in fast moving situations."[16]

Although it is possible that Hill-Norton may be incorrect, that a former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, one of the highest military offices in the Alliance, is constrained to suggest this is cause for concern in light of the preceding discussion of the time problem which now faces NATO. It must be reiterated that the security of NATO's Northern Flank depends on the early arrival of reinforcements. If there is inadequate warning time, compounded by problems with political decision-making, it is possible that the Northern Flank may be turned with potentially disastrous results for NATO as a whole.

The second dimension of the political problem which mitigates against Canada effectively fulfilling its commitment to the security of NATO's Northern Flank, particularly in Norway, involves the so-called base and ban policy of the Norwegian government. It must be stated here that the reasons for the Norwegian base and ban policy are complex, and as such no attempt can be made in this study to deal with all the reasons in a fully satisfactory manner. Again, it will have to suffice to discuss them in general terms in order to relate it to the Canadian commitment.[17]

---

[16] Ibid., p. 103.

[17] For a detailed treatment of the roots of the base and ban policy, see J. J. Holst, Five Roads to Nordic Security (Oslo: Universitetforlaget, 1973) and T. Miljan, The Reluctant Europeans (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1977).

In 1949, Norway, in a break from the traditional Scandinavian policies of non-alignment, became a founding member of NATO. Norway joined the Alliance for much the same reason as the other original signatories, since it perceived a threat from the Soviet Union and saw collective defence measures as the only sure method to prevent Soviet aggression in Europe. Having said this, however, Norwegian membership in NATO was contingent on NATO agreeing not to establish foreign military bases on Norwegian territory. In February of 1949 (two months before the signing of the NATO treaty, and six months before it came into force), the Norwegian government declared that Norway "will not open bases on its territory for the armed forces of foreign nations as long as Norway is not attacked or exposed to threats of attack."[18] This policy was further elaborated upon in February of 1951 when the Norwegian Defence Minister Hauge clarified the restriction by stating that the policy did not exclude:

1) that Norway opened up bases for allied forces at the time of armed attack on the North Atlantic area or at a time Norwegian authorities felt exposed to threats of attack and invite allied armed forces to Norway;
2) that Norway in the prescribed constitutional forms conclude conditional agreements with allied countries with such a situation in mind;
3) that Norway constructs such military facilities which may be necessary to receive and support the allied forces which are necessary to assist in the defence of the country;
4) that Norway participates in common allied exercises or receives brief visits by allied air or naval forces in peacetime.[19]

---

[18]Cited in S. Lodgaard and N. P. Gleditsch, "Norway - The Not So Reluctant Ally," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1977, p. 209.

[19]Cited in ibid., p. 210.

In 1957 a second restriction was placed on NATO by Norway.[20] This restriction, involving nuclear weapons was announced by Norwegian Prime Minister Gerhardsen at a NATO heads of government meeting. The statement concluded that Norway would not allow NATO to stockpile nuclear warheads or position intermediate range ballistic missiles on Norwegian territory. Again, this restriction applies only during peacetime, and Norway can decide to allow nuclear weapons to be positioned in Norway in wartime or at a time of threat of war. What this policy does, is to create certain logistical problems which however, can and probably will be overcome in the event of a crisis.[21]

The basic premise for both of these restrictions and subsequent minor restrictions, is to avoid provoking the Societ Union. "The desire not to provoke the Soviet Union has important historical roots. The 196 km long Soviet-Norwegian border has never been violated...and military mobilisation of this border following Norwegian entry into NATO could have initiated considerable hostility and escalation over a traditionally peaceful border."[22] In spite of the understandable desire to avoid provoking the Soviet Union and of the fact that these restrictions in no way imply a legal commitment on Norway's part to maintain them, they have created a level of difficulty for NATO in general, and Canada in particular, in attempting to guarantee the security and integrity of NATO's Northern Flank.

---

[20]The 1957 announcement represented a de facto ban on nuclear weapons. It was only after a 1961 Labour Party Conference that the ban came into effect as party policy.

[21]Lodgaard and Gleditsch, op. cit., p. 210.

[22]Ibid., p. 211.

While NATO has attempted to ameliorate the problem of reinforcing Norway in times of crisis through the prepositioning of equipment, the fundamental question remains. Is it possible for the reinforcements to arrive early enough to ensure that the security of NATO's Northern Flank is maintained?

The answer to this question lies in the overcoming of the technical problems, which was the third and final problem identified above. Again, there are several dimensions to this problem, the first dimension being the ability of NATO to keep open the vital air and sea lanes of communication (ALOC and SLOC) to transport reinforcements to Norway. The second dimension of this problem involves the ability of Canada to mobilize the manpower reserves quickly enough to have them in place prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

In a recent analysis of the security of the air and sea lanes of communication in the North Atlantic, Sherwood Cordier has summarized their importance to the Alliance by stating that "above all, the security of western Europe hinges upon the untrammeled use of the North Atlantic."[23] That this is the case has become very evident to NATO, as has the fact that the Soviet Union may be capable of interdicting these vital links between Europe and North America. The nature of the Soviet threat to these links has been well documented by Western analysts, and only a brief discussion will be provided here.[24] In

---

[23]Cordier, op. cit., p. 1.

[24]For a detailed analysis, see Cordier, ibid. or Paul Nitze and Leonard Sullivan, Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979).

general, the Soviet threat is a three dimensional threat, involving air, surface and subsurface forces. Taken together, this Soviet threat poses a significant challenge to NATO in the vital battle to keep the air and sea lanes open for Western use.

Over the past decade, the Soviet tactical air weapon has been transformed both quantitatively and qualitatively, to such an extent that it now poses a formidable threat to the NATO air forces stationed in Europe. In the past it was assumed that these NATO forces, already in place, were capable of meeting the Soviet air challenge in the battle for supremacy in the air. One particular aspect of the air battle in Europe would involve ensuring that NATO air supremacy in the eastern reaches of the Atlantic is maintained so that the reinforcements and material being transferred to Europe could arrive relatively unhindered. With the recent quantitative and qualitative changes in the Soviet tactical air force, it is now unclear whether NATO is indeed capable of securing air supremacy. The Soviet Union now possess the ability to launch devastating attacks on NATO air bases, port facilities and perhaps even the incoming reinforcements. In Cordier's view, the Alliance is "confronted by such a foe [that] the United States and its allies will be hard pressed indeed to win the control of the air so crucial to the defense of Western Europe."[25]

The Soviet naval threat in the North Atlantic was dealt with at some length in the preceding chapter. It will suffice here to merely reiterate the significance of this threat to the lanes of communication.

---

[25]Cordier, ibid., p. 3.

The Soviet naval building programme, both surface and subsurface, has resulted in a force capable of carrying out the activities in the open oceans some distance from the Soviet Union. A major benefactor of the building programme has been the Soviet Northern Fleet, which is now capable of moving through the strategic GIUK Gap to challenge NATO naval forces in the North Atlantic. The submarine component of the Northern Fleet poses some difficult challenges to NATO. The NATO naval forces rely heavily on carrier based air power, and aircraft carriers are vital to NATO planning. If the Soviet submarine force is able to break through the NATO barriers strung along the GIUK Gap and undertake operations in the North Atlantic, it is unclear whether NATO will be able to operate in this region without first carrying out extensive anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations, and then sending in carrier task forces in order to attempt to reassert control of the seas. This would undoubtedly be a long and time-consuming task, yet NATO relies fundamentally on being able to quickly reinforce Western Europe in the event of hostilities. The challenge posed by the Soviet air and naval forces to the security of the air and sea lanes of the North Atlantic is formidable indeed. Whether NATO can depend on maintaining supremacy in the North Atlantic is now open to question, yet NATO strategy is based on the assumption that the required reinforcements will arrive in time.

A second technical problem which calls into question the ability of Canada to fulfill its present commitment to NATO's Northern Flank through the timely arrival of the earmarked forces has its roots in Canada. The existing manpower levels of Mobile Command, coupled

with multiple tasking of these forces, imposes severe constraints on the ability of Canada to deliver the CAST Group to Norway early enough to act as a deterrent and in the event of a crisis to sustain its operations. It will be necessary at this point to examine in some detail the manpower levels and the tasks of Mobile Command in order to illustrate the difficulties which face the Canadian Armed Forces in fulfilling the CAST commitment.

At the present time, Mobile Command has an active strength of 16,000 Regular forces.[26] With this pool of manpower to draw on, Mobile Command has the following tasks to perform:

1) providing augmentation troops for the Fourth Canadian Mechanised Brigade Group stationed in Germany;
2) maintaining the CAST force for deployment to Norway;
3) keeping units in readiness for deployment to Europe as part of the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force;
4) providing troops for peacekeeping forces in Cyprus, the Middle East, and elsewhere;
5) ensuring the land defence of Canadian territory;
6) carrying out duties related to the protection of Canada, including aid to the civil power; and
7) assisting in national development through such activities as mapping, charting, and bridge-building and airfield construction in the North.[27]

This multiple tasking, on top of the small manpower pool, creates severe difficulties for Canada in fulfilling its commitments to NATO in general and to Norway in particular. In the view of

---

[26]Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Defence, First Report: Manpower in Canada's Armed Forces (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1982), p. 18.

[27]Ibid., p. 16.

strategist R. B. Byers of York University, "(t)he Canadian Armed Forces are undermanned, multi-tasked and will continue to lack the necessary tasks which have been assigned by the government."[28] This point was made abundantly clear by Lt. General Chouinard, former Deputy Commander of Mobile Command, in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on National Defence. According to Chouinard, the CAST Group as it is presently structured is ill-prepared to fulfill its role in Norway.[29] By its very role, the CAST Group must mobilize and deploy in Norway as rapidly as possible. This leaves little or no time for the Group to be brought up to proper strength. It must deploy with the forces in being. In Chouinard's estimation, the CAST Group is composed of three infantry battalions of 605 men each plus support units, bringing the total forces in being to "somewhere around 2,000."[30]

Not only is the CAST Group undermanned for its tasks in Norway, but there is doubt as to whether after, or if it gets there, it will be able to sustain itself in operations. Chouinard believes "...that we have enough infantry battalions to do the job only up to the very beginning of an emergency. However, as soon as operations have started you have to have other battalions as reinforcement units in behind the CAST combat group somewhere in England or Scotland."[31] At the present

---

[28]Canada, Senate, Subcommittee on National Defence, Proceedings, Thursday, February 10, 1981.

[29]Chouinard, op. cit., pp. 7, 8 and 15-16.

[30]Ibid., p. 16.

[31]Ibid., p. 18.

time, the Canadian Forces, with the manpower levels and the multiple commitments is in no position to supply these essential reinforcements. In order to bring the CAST Group up to strength, and also to bring the other Canadian commitment in Europe, the 4 CMBG, up to strength would require the stripping of the remaining two brigades in Canada. This would leave less than a brigade in all of Canada, yet it is essential to bring the CAST Group and the 4 CMBG up to strength if they are to be able to meet their requirements at the outset, to say nothing of the need for reinforcements once operations begin.

Faced with a need to strip Mobile Command bare in order to fulfill the NATO commitments is cause enough for concern, yet coupled with the time element and transportation problems, the CAST commitment appears to be an unrealistic one from the very outset. These problems seem to be so overwhelming that the CAST commitment is no longer considered to be a credible one. The Senate Subcommittee on National Defence in its First Report, after hearing much testimony on this commitment, was moved to question "whether Canada should endeavour to improve the present force or seek alternative NATO tasks for its 4,000 men."[32] Having said this, however, the Subcommittee also conceded that difficulties involved in dropping the commitment. It stated that:

> (t)he CAST and ACE Mobile commitments have substantial political significance as expressions of Canada's readiness to come to the defence of two important allies, and

---

[32]Senate Subcommittee on National Defence, First Report, op. cit. Note the discrepancy in the force levels between the figures cited by the Subcommittee (4,000) and the figure cited by Chouinard (2,000). The 4,000 figure represents a paper strength, while the 2,000 figure represents "forces in being".

> the Canadian government would probably encounter strong objections from Norway and Denmark if it raised the question of relinquishing them.[33]

The fact that the Subcommittee conceded that there may be political difficulties in abandoning the CAST commitment altogether, taken with its recommendations on strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces through providing increased manpower would appear to indicate that the CAST commitment, in the Subcommittee's view, is likely to remain a part of Canada's overall commitment to NATO. Further evidence for this view was provided in a speech before the Conference of Defence Associations by the Minister of National Defence, Gilles Lamontagne. He announced that the Canadian Cabinet, in consultation with the new Norwegian government, has agreed "to proceed with prepositioning of equipment and stores in Norway for the lead battalion of the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable brigade group."[34]

Be that as it may, many of the problems outlined in this chapter with regard to the commitment to the Northern Flank are beyond Canadian control and as such there remains the doubt about the viability of this commitment. This leads one to consider whether alternatives may be available which Canada might pursue in order to fulfill this vital commitment. Michael MccGwire, discussing NATO naval strategy in an appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on National Defence, emphasized the importance of the Northern Flank and suggested an

---

[33] Ibid., p. 19.

[34] Minister of National Defence, "Remarks by the Hon. Gilles Lamontagne to the Conference of Defence Associations," January 14, 1982, p. 20.

alternate Canadian role in this region. MccGwire stated that the Northern Flank "...has become more important recently because of the growing importance of the Norwegian Sea at the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union."[35] He goes on to suggest that "...we do not at the moment exploit it [the Northern Flank] properly."[36] In order for NATO to exploit the Northern Flank more fully, MccGwire believes that "a Nordic tier in NATO, perhaps a Canadian CINC North"[37] would be appropriate. This would involve Canada relinquishing its role in the Central Front and shifting these forces to the new Northern Command system.[38]

George Bell, also in an appearance before the Subcommittee on National Defence, recognized the difficulties which face the CAST commitment. He has suggested prepositioning the equipment for the lead battalion of the CAST Group in Norway, and undertaking comprehensive rotational training for the various units of the CAST Group.[39] Bell also suggests that as the importance of the Arctic grows, there will be a "need for some sort of northern base."[40] With this in mind, the next

---

[35]Senate, Subcommittee on National Defence, Proceedings, Issue No. 25, March 23, 1982, p. 11.

[36]Ibid., p. 13.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid. MccGwire believes that this would be to the advantage of both Canada and NATO. Canada would have only one European commitment and NATO would benefit from a strengthened Northern Flank.

[39]Senate, Subcommittee on National Defence, Proceedings, Issue No. 19, June 9, 1981, p. 44.

[40]Ibid., p. 48.

chapter will address some of the alternatives available to Canada in fulfilling this commitment to NATO's Northern Flank, alternatives which for the purposes of this study will be termed the "Northern Base Option".

CHAPTER III

THE NORTHERN BASE OPTION: CANADA

In view of the increased capability of the Soviet Union along NATO's Northern Flank, and of the problems which confront the present Canadian commitment of the CAST Group to the security of this region, this chapter will outline what will be termed the Northern Base Option. It will assess whether this is a viable alternative for the security of a region which is now being recognized as strategically vital to the Alliance as a whole. It must be noted at this point that what is referred to as the Northern Base Option represents a far from monolithic approach among Canadian defence analysts with respect to security arrangements in the Arctic. This study will make no attempt to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the full range of issues addressed by this group, but will be limited to an analysis of those issues which are of direct relevance to Canada's commitment to the security of NATO's Northern Flank. The first step is to identify the literature which constitutes the Northern approach to Canadian defence policy and, more precisely, the Northern Base Option.

The group of defence analysts, academics and writers which is concerned with a Northern orientation or Northern Base Option as part of Canadian defence policy is, even in Canadian terms, relatively

small.[1] This factor could be considered something of a limitation in that there is a considerable amount of repetition in the literature, and perhaps owing to the relatively narrow focus there has been little cross-fertilization of ideas. While it may be theoretically possible to identify the different approaches and place them into separate streams, such an exercise would prove to be far beyond the scope of this study.

Having established the parameters of the remainder of this chapter quite precisely, with the specific objective of analysing and assessing the various approaches to the issue of a Northern Base Option, it is possible to now turn to such an exercise. The methodology by which this analysis will be carried out will be to proceed from what might be considered the least sophisticated or least developed line of reasoning, through to the most sophisticated and developed analysis of the question at hand. Bearing in mind that this is a somewhat arbitrary approach, the order of treatment will begin with the ideas and writings of George Ignatieff and continue with Franklyn Griffiths, Clay Beattie, Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, and conclude with the ideas and writings of Nicholas Tracy.

George Ignatieff, a former Canadian Ambassador to NATO, has for a number of years been writing on the present state and future course of Canadian defence policy. An integral part of Ignatieff's writing

---

[1] The following are those who have examined a Northern Orientation or Northern Base Option for Canadian defence policy: Franklyn Griffiths, Nils Ørvik, George Ignatieff, Joseph Jockel, Joel Sokolsky, Clay Beattie, and Nicholas Tracy.

involves the Northern Flank of NATO and Canada's security activities in the Arctic. While Ignatieff's background [2] should in theory lend itself well to such a task, it is unfortunate that his suggestions concerning the Northern Flank are not more practical.

The central pillar of Ignatieff's views on this question is that Canada has not developed any national policy for its security. In an address to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies on 12 October 1979, Ignatieff stated that "... Canada, because of certain geographic and historic factors has had no "national policy" save one borrowed from its powerful neighbour- known as "deterrence" ." [3] This theme is reiterated in Ignatieff's other writings on the subject, yet each time he neglects to state why Canada cannot develop a true national security policy. [4] Ignatieff then proceeds to outline what he believes should be the basis for Canadian security policy.

---

[2]Ignatieff has held numerous diplomatic postings, three of which are of direct relevance here. He has served as Canada's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, NATO and the Geneva Disarmament Committee.

[3]George Ignatieff, "NATO Thirty Years On - And What About Canada's Role?," Draft of an address to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, October 12, 1979, p. 1.

[4]Also, see George Ignatieff, "In Self-defence," MacLeans, April 21, 1980, p. 6; "Updating Canadian Security," Policy Options, Vol. 2, No. 4, Spetember/October 1980, pp. 6-10; and "Canadian Foreign Policy in an Interdependent World," Spectrum, Vol. 1, No. 4, September 1980, pp. 5-9.

Ignatieff's recommendations and prescriptions for a Canadian national security policy are deceptively simple, couched in such a way that to criticise them would be akin to attacking motherhood, yet it is precisely because they are so general, that they are also inherently flawed. The basis for Canada's security policy should in Ignatieff's view

> ...depend not on weapons alone, especially nuclear weapons, but upon global cooperation in removing the causes of war: through the peaceful settlement of international disputes as provided for under the UN Charter; removing the all-too-apparent divisions between rich nations and poor; and the negotiation of arms limitation measures and detente.[5]

Having laid the foundations for what he considers to be a Canadian national security policy, Ignatieff turns his attention to the Northern Flank of NATO and to Canada's Arctic, areas which are crucial to the security of NATO and therefore Canada.

According to Ignatieff, "...it strikes some as unnatural to belong to a peacetime defence arrangement which requires Canada to keep expensive military forces in Europe, while our own North, and especially our Arctic region, are left largely unprotected from foreign encroachments."[6] In order to rectify this Ignatieff advocates the resurrection of an idea of Lester Pearson, who in the 1950s as Secretary of State for External Affairs suggested that NATO should include the Canadian Arctic in the defence of the Northern Flank. While this may appear to be an

---

[5]Ignatieff, "Canadian Foreign Policy in an Interdependent World," ibid., p. 5.

[6]Ibid., p. 6.

attractive solution to the defence of the vital Northern Flank, upon further examination it runs up against two major obstacles. The first obstacle, and one that Ignatieff recognizes, is that "...this clearly implies that the United States would have to be willing to share decision-making about North American defence with the European members of NATO."[7] Ignatieff is convinced that the United States would agree to this, particularly now when "...American military capabilities are strained in trying to match the expanding power of the Soviet Union and its threats to NATO's flanks."[8] A NATO Arctic command encompassing what is known as the Northern Rim would result in a more equitable burden sharing than that which presently exists. Despite the apparent attractiveness of this proposition, it is not at all clear that the United States would be willing to accept it. In light of the problems of NATO decision-making machinery, the United States may be more than a little reluctant to involve the defence of North America in what might prove to be a cumbersome command structure. The United States would be, and is, better served by the bilateral arrangements under which NORAD operates than through a multilateral NATO arrangement.

The second obstacle which stands in the path of a NATO Arctic Command, one which Ignatieff does not concede, is that the Northern European members of NATO may not be willing to participate. At a time when defence budgets in NATO are strained to the limit, the idea that the Northern European members of NATO, particularly Norway, Denmark and

---

[7] Ibid., p. 6.

[8] Ibid.

Great Britain would be in a position to contribute money and forces seem to be somewhat unrealistic.[9] Above and beyond this, Ignatieff at no point discusses the mechanics of setting up a NATO Arctic Command except to suggest that it would involve no fundamental renegotiation of the NATO Charter.[10] Nowhere does he suggest what type of facilities would be required, what type of basing arrangements would be required, nor even which NATO states would provide the men, material or money. At a time when the balance of forces along the Northern Flank is skewed so dramatically in favour of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the notion that the Northern European members would be willing to contribute to a NATO Arctic Command involving the Canadian Arctic seems to be stretching the point too far.

It would appear that beneath this analysis of the situation along NATO's Northern Flank and in the Canadian Arctic, Ignatieff is concerned with something more than the Soviet threat, something which for the purposes of this study will be termed the "American factor". According to Ignatieff, "...it is, to say the least, an anomaly that, while Canada's territorial boundaries to the east, south, and west are well established and recognized the location of our northern boundary is still a matter of dispute with our ally and continental partner, the USA, as well as with the USSR."[11] Rather

---

[9]This point will be expanded upon in the analysis of Nils Ørvik's writings, since he discusses this obstacle more fully.

[10]Ignatieff, "In Self-defence," op. cit., p. 6.

[11]Ignatieff, "Updating Canadian Security," op. cit., p. 7.

than taking Ignatieff's point about Canada's sovereignty any further, it is possible to now turn to an examination of the ideas and writings of Franklyn Griffiths, for Griffiths' central concern relates to the sovereignty question and he develops it to a much greater extent than does Ignatieff.

Franklyn Griffiths, Soviet specialist at the University of Toronto, has since the mid seventies worked on the northern orientation of Canadian foreign and defence policy. Griffiths might be taken to represent an "intellectual" approach to these questions, motivated in part by a concern for the security of the North and in part by a concern for what has been termed a "multi-faceted American threat to Canadian sovereignty." [12] According to Nils Ørvik, Griffiths has been the pacesetter in the approach to the North which focuses on the perceived American threat. [13] Griffiths first articulated his views in an essay contributed to a volume of essays, The Arctic in Question, and expanded upon them later in his A Northern Foreign Policy . [14] While Ørvik is correct in noting that Griffiths was the pacesetter in this approach, it must be stated at this point that Griffiths is not representative of that group of academics in the late sixties and early seventies who,

---

[12] Nils Ørvik, Canada's Northern Security: The Eastern Dimension, National Security Series No. 2/82 (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 1982), p. 27.

[13] Ibid., p. 27.

[14] Franklyn Griffiths, "Canadian Sovereignty and Arctic International Relations," in E. J. Dosman (ed.), The Arctic in Question (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 140-162; and Franklyn Griffiths, A Northern Foreign Policy (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979).

while also concerned with the North and the "American threat," sought to repudiate Canadian participation in NATO and NORAD.[15] Griffiths clearly sees the need for Canada to continue as a member of NATO, but advocates a readjustment and relocation of Canadian commitments and forces in order to meet the perceived American threat.

In his essay in The Arctic in Question, Griffiths most strikingly highlights his concern for the American factor when he states that "...the United States is the principal offender"[16] standing in the way of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Griffiths, taking his argument to the extreme is led to conclude that "...the Arctic is in real danger of becoming North American without ever having been effectively Canadian."[17] For Griffiths, the American factor is clearly the most crucial issue in the North. In order to avoid the spectre of the Arctic becoming North American (read American) before it was ever truly Canadian, Griffiths has at various times advocated a number of approaches.

At one point, Griffiths has suggested what he terms an activist approach. This would involve Canada being more assertive in its relationship with the United States in regard to sovereignty claims in the north. While Griffiths concludes that this approach would have an

---

[15] For an indication of the nature of this argument, see Stephen Clarkson (ed.), An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968).

[16] Griffiths, "Canadian Sovereignty and Arctic International Relations," op. cit., p. 141.

[17] Ibid., p. 142.

unsettling effect on the full range of Canadian-American relations, he feels that it is price which must be paid.[18] For Griffiths, the importance of the Arctic makes it imperative that it be handled as an issue of prime importance.

> After all it is the integrity of Canada that is the question. This is surely a priority matter for a self-respecting people. It should not be viewed but also treated as such.[19]

Once Griffiths has made it clear that he is willing to follow an activist approach, he has suggested a number of courses open to Canada in pursuing this objective. In light of the existing bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States, a relationship which puts Canada "...at a disadvantage,"[20] Griffiths suggests that Canada work within a multilateral framework. This multilateral framework would incorporate the other Arctic states. Such a framework would allow Canada to counterbalance the dominance of the United States. While his initial proposal in The Arctic in Question envisaged a role for the Soviet Union in this multilateral framework, by 1979 in his A Northern Foreign Policy, Griffiths has abandoned this idea in favour of a small power framework incorporating Canada, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. While this would appear to indicate that security issues are more important, particularly the Soviet threat, the American factor is still a major consideration. The extent to which this is the case is

---

[18] For a fuller description of the activist approach, see ibid., pp. 141-144.

[19] Ibid., p. 149.

[20] Ibid., p. 153.

indicated by Griffiths, perhaps somewhat implicitly, when he stated that "(o)n occasion...security may be only the nominal concern of policy addressed in reality to quite different issues...."[21] Bearing this in mind, it is now possible to turn to an examination of Griffiths' views on security in the North.

Griffiths, in discussing security in the North is moved to divide Canada's interests in this region into four sub-regions - the Northeast Atlantic, the Canadian Arctic, the Polar Basin and the Bering Strait area. [22] Attention here will be paid to Griffiths' discussion of the security of the Northeast Atlantic, since it readily corresponds to the Northern Flank. In this way Griffiths' views can be readily assessed within the framework of this study.

Griffiths' analysis of the security of this region begins with the basic assumption "... that the problems in this region are increasingly political in nature..." [23] The political problems with which Griffiths is concerned involve a sense of isolation, a desire for self-determination, nationalism and an anti-war sentiment in the communities

---

[21] Griffiths, A Northern Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 44.

[22] Ibid., p. 44.

[23] Ibid., p. 45.

bordering the Northeast Atlantic.[24] While Griffiths concedes that these factors did not prevent Norway and Iceland from entering NATO, nor Greenland and the Faroes through Danish membership, he feels that "...(t)hey nevertheless serve to limit alliance participation today."[25] The limitations which Griffiths refers to in the Norwegian case are the well-known base and ban policies discussed in the previous chapter. In the case of Iceland, Griffiths points to the lack of any real military capability and a strong deep-rooted anti-war sentiment. Greenland and the Faroes, both within the Danish realm, hold a certain level of resentment against Denmark and against the American military facilities, particularly the large United States base at Thule in Greenland.[26]

These factors constitute the political background to the security of the Northeast Atlantic region, a security which is threatened by the enhanced capabilities of the Soviet Union along the Northern Flank. Griffiths, after briefly characterizing the nature of the Soviet threat in a manner similar to the threat assessment presented in Chapter I of this study, turns his attention to the potential contributions Canada could make in the region. His recommendations fall into two spheres, the political contributions Canada could make and the military contributions. In the political sphere Griffiths' central concern is Iceland.[27] He points to the fact that Iceland is

---

[24]The communities which Griffiths refers to are Greenland, Iceland, Faroes and Norway, ibid., p. 45.

[25]Ibid., p. 45.

[26]Ibid., pp. 47-48.

[27]Ibid., p. 4

subject to a large Soviet and Warsaw Pact diplomatic presence. At the time of publication of A Northern Foreign Policy, Griffiths reported that this diplomatic presence consisted of some two hundred persons in a country of only 225,000 people. According to Griffiths, "(t)he Russians and East Europeans... are working to create a political context in which an Iceland isolated from its allies will eventually ask the United States to leave Keflavik." [28] In order to prevent such an eventuality from occurring, Griffiths suggests that Canada open an embassy in Reykjavik and establish stronger contacts with Iceland. He believes that this would in some measure offset the dominant presence of the Soviet Union and that it would exert a positive influence on Icelandic public opinion in support of NATO. [29]

On the surface these recommendations seem to be logical, but it is not clear that they would serve the purpose which Griffiths envisages. First, if Canada were to open an embassy in Reykjavik it would probably necessitate Iceland opening an embassy in Ottawa. This would undoubtedly place financial and personnel strains on the Icelandic foreign service. Secondly, Canada and Iceland have little in common beyond their Northern character. Both states compete for the same markets in terms of the sale of fish resources. This could prove to be a major stumbling block to improved Canadian-Icelandic relations, particularly when Iceland depends so heavily on its fish resources. Thirdly, the traditional

---

[28] Ibid., pp. 49-50. Keflavik is the location of the United States military base in Iceland.

[29] Ibid., p. 50.

Icelandic distrust of 'foreigners' might extend to Canadians as well, particularly if they are perceived as competitors for Icelandic markets. While it is impossible to substantiate this point, it might well prove to be an important factor.[30]

Within the military sphere, Griffiths suggests that Canada could make a strong contribution to the security of Iceland in order to counter the growing Soviet threat. With the increasingly obsolete nature of the United States' early warning and interceptor forces in Iceland, Griffiths suggests that "...Canada should consider offering to contribute to the alliance's need for land-based air defence and airborne ASW capabilities in Iceland."[31] Recent Canadian equipment procurement, particularly the LRPA (Long Range Patrol Aircraft) and the NFA (New Fighter Aircraft), would according to Griffiths be ideal for such a task. In order to fulfill this task, Griffiths offers two alternatives. The first would be to "...station Canadian aircraft at Keflavik for year-round operations there."[32] The second alternative would be for Canada to stage "...infrequent but regular deployments there, which would demonstrate Canada's capacity to contribute in the event of a crisis."[33]

While both of these alternatives are somewhat attractive, they are not without problems. With regard to the possibility of stationing

---

[30]These points are discussed more fully in Nils Ørvik, Canada's Northern Security: The Eastern Dimension, op. cit., pp. 45-51.

[31]Griffiths, A Northern Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 51.

[32]Ibid., p. 51.

[33]Ibid., p. 51.

Canadian aircraft in Iceland on a permanent basis, this would involve a major new task for the already over-committed Canadian Armed Forces. Griffiths recognizes this and suggests a reordering of existing tasks and commitments. It is unclear that such a reordering is possible in that it would involve diverting scarce airpower resources from the stated priorities of the Canadian Forces, the protection of sovereignty and surveillance roles.[34] In terms of the second alternative, infrequent but regular Canadian deployments to Iceland, this flies in the face of the problem outlined in the previous chapter. As time in a crisis situation is more and more at a premium, it remains to be seen whether the earmarked Canadian forces could arrive early enough to influence the crisis in favour of NATO.

Having made observations and recommendations concerning the security of Iceland, Griffiths turns his attention to the situation in Norway. Again he identifies political and military spheres. In the political sphere Griffiths believes that Canadian-Norwegian relations, while they are very good, are not diversified or deep enough. He advocates social and cultural exchanges, scientific and technical cooperation, and Canadian support for the Norwegian position on the Svalbard question.[35] According to Griffiths, "...these and other activities of interest to Canada could contribute to meeting the pronounced need for political cooperation in defence of the Northern Flank."[36] While it is

---

[34]Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the Seventies: White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), p. 16.

[35]Griffiths, A Northern Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 52.

[36]Ibid., p. 52.

true that there is scope for improved political relations between Canada and Norway, Griffiths concedes that the military sphere is where most of the work needs to be done. Griffiths outlines the problematic nature of the present Canadian commitment to the security of Norway and suggests three ways in which these problems could be overcome.

The first suggestion involves regular airlifted deployments of the CAST Force to North Norway each time the Soviet Union exercises in the near vicinity. This would accomplish two things. "Regular deployments of some 1,000 members of the CAST Combat Group could have beneficial effects on Norwegian morale and public awareness of the Canadian connection."[37] Secondly, these deployments would "...accustom Canadian decision-makers and the Canadian public to the character of Canada's commitment and to the absolutely vital necessity to dispatch Canadian forces before it is too late."[38] While it is clearly desireable to maintain a strong level of public awareness in both Canada and Norway of the Canadian commitment to the defence of Norway, this in itself is not sufficient. With the present nature of the Canadian commitment, the ability to deliver is of equal importance, and it is here that there is considerable uneasiness. Griffiths recognizes this factor in his second suggestion which involves more comprehensive prestocking arrangements and increased cooperation in the area of standardization of military equipment.[39]

---

[37] Ibid., p. 53.

[38] Ibid., p. 53.

[39] Ibid., p. 54. While Canada and Norway now have more comprehensive prestocking arrangements, it is still questionable whether the CAST Group personnel can be delivered in time or indeed at all.

These first two suggestions lay the groundwork for his third suggestion which involves an increased ability to deliver the CAST Group to Norway in times of crisis. The credibility of the CAST Group under present circumstances founders on the time required to put forces on the ground in Norway. To rectify this, Griffiths suggests that Canada acquire additional airlift capability, and that a joint northern air transport command involving Canada and Norway be established. According to Griffiths, these factors "...would serve to validate Canada's commitment...to provide reassurance to Norway and to express the common interests of the two countries in highly visible form."[40]

Although the measures which Griffiths has suggested would go some distance in furthering the credibility of the Canadian commitment to the Northern Flank, it is still open to question whether they go far enough. In light of the evidence presented earlier that the Soviet Union may be capable of launching an attack from a near standing start, merely reducing the time required from the present three or four weeks to the one week originally envisaged is not enough. Unless the CAST Group is in place prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the outcome could, in Griffiths' words, "...be worse than Dunkirk."[41]

Above and beyond the question of time in relation to the delivery of the CAST Group to Norway, there is a flaw in Griffiths' approach to the security of the Northern Flank. The flaw is one of emphasis. Griffiths' approach to the issue is one of attempting to

---

[40] Ibid., pp. 54-55.

[41] Ibid., p. 53.

contribute to the defence of the Northern Flank across the entire spectrum of the region. He suggests commitments to Iceland, Norway and to Greenland.[42] This spreads Canada's already scarce military forces more thinly than they already are. If the Soviets choose to move against the Northern Flank of NATO, Northern Norway is the key. It would be a highly irresponsible Soviet military commander who would contemplate forcing the GIUK Gap and attacking Iceland without first securing control in North Norway. In this sense, Northern Norway is the front line and should receive priority. Griffiths' piecemeal approach does not go far enough in fulfilling this goal.

Having examined the ideas of Franklyn Griffiths regarding a Northern orientation in Canadian defence policy, this study will now focus on the proposals of Brigadier-General Clayton Beattie (Ret'd). Beattie, recently retired Director-General (Policy Planning) of the Department of National Defence and a former commander of the Canadian Forces Northern Region Headquarters in Yellowknife, should be able to provide a unique insight into the question of a Northern orientation and a Northern Base Option. Unlike those who have taken an intellectual approach to the question, Beattie has specific military objectives in mind. He does not discuss foreign policy issues other than the importance of the strategic mineral resources located in the North for Canada and for the West in general.

---

[42]The suggestions with regard to Greenland are mainly political in nature, such as facilitating cooperation between the Inuit in Canada and the Greenlanders in preparation for wider ranging ties.

Beattie's concern is that "(f)or a long time we've logically considered the defence of Canada being in northwestern Europe...(a)t the same time we have viewed northern Norway as the northern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."[43] The problem with this situation as Beattie sees it is that "...looking at the world from the North Pole gives northern Canada a significant share of NATO's flank."[44] The danger of the present situation is that "(i)f we leave that flank weak we might well leave ourselves open to the Maginot (Line) Syndrome and be outflanked through the Canadian Arctic."[45] The present level of Canadian military presence in the North is negligible, consisting of a headquarters staff at Yellowknife, 700 Canadian Forces personnel located at DEW Line stations and various other military outposts and 600 Canadian Rangers.[46] With a total manpower pool of slightly more than 1,300 personnel, these forces are tasked to defend 8.7 million square kilometers of territory. To further complicate the situation, Soviet submarines can operate under the Arctic ice undetected by the Canadian Forces. While it is possible that the United States may have the ability to track and counter these Soviet submarines, it remains unclear whether they could deal with this threat fully.[47] The danger that this

---

[43]Brigadier General Clayton Beattie, "Arctic Military Boost Urged," Ottawa Journal, Thursday, February 28, 1980.

[44]Ibid. [45]Ibid.

[46]Beattie, "Arctic oil and gas pose defence dilemma," Edmonton Journal, Wednesday, February 27, 1980.

[47]"Northern Defence Called a Weak Link," The Daily Gleaner, Wednesday, September 16, 1981.

situation poses is that Soviet ballistic missile firing submarines may be able to launch a missile attack from the Arctic, reducing available warning time.

In order to rectify this deficiency in the North, Beattie has advocated a Northern Base. He maintains that the Department of National Defence was contemplating the establishment of a Northern Base as far back as fifteen years ago, but for a variety of reasons, mostly financial, it has never moved beyond the planning stage.[48] Beattie's most recent suggestion for the establishment of a Northern Base involves discussions with the sponsors of the Arctic Pilot Project in order to tie in the base with commercial development. Sharing costs would make both less expensive and therefore more viable. Where the base would be located, if it is ever constructed remains uncertain. Beattie has suggested that there are several possible locations including Radstock Bay on Devon Island, Little Cornwallis Island, Baffin Island, or Melville Island.[49]

The issue which Beattie does not address adequately is what purpose this base would serve. In a purely Canadian context, it could serve as a further assertion of Canadian sovereignty in that a Northern Base would allow the Canadian forces to investigate Soviet ice flows in Canadian waters. It would also allow the Canadian Forces to attempt to

---

[48]Brigadier-General Clay Beattie, Press Conference, February 26, 1980, as reported in the Edmonton Sun, Thursday, February 28, 1980, "High Arctic Base? Forces on the Move in the North," p. 4.

[49]Ibid.

counter potential Soviet landings more rapidly, although these are a remote possibility. The Arctic environment renders military operations of any sort very difficult, and the Soviets would no doubt take this into consider .ion before attempting a landing which would yield only marginal gains. On the whole, while Canada's military capability in the North is weak, there is no direct military threat from the Soviet Union. In terms of sovereignty, the Soviet Union is not challenging Canada's claim, a stance that would only undermine the Soviet's own similar claim to its sector of the Arctic.

In a NATO context, however, a Canadian Northern Base would do very little. There is no direct Soviet threat. Although Soviet SSBNs are capable of operating under the Arctic ice, it is questionable whether this yields the Soviets any great advantage. According to Commodore Gordon Edwards, who concedes the fact that Soviet submarines could move secretly under the Arctic ice, the question is "...why [would they] bother?"[50] Edwards believes that comprehensive strategic operations under the Arctic ice might prove to be extremely difficult.[51] The newest Soviet SSBNs and SLBMs are now capable of covering targets in North America from east of the GIUK Gap.[52] Why they would consider trying to force the GIUK Gap, or outflank the Gap by traversing the Arctic ice

---

[50]Commodore Gordon Edwards cited in "Northern Defence Called a Weak Link," The Daily Gleaner, op. cit.

[51]Ibid.

[52]The Soviet Delta Class SSBNs are equipped with SS-N-8 SLBM with a range of 4,300 nautical miles. See Sherwood S. Cordier, The Air and Sea Lanes of the North Atlantic (Washington: University Press of America, 1981), p. 26.

and navigating the dangerous waters between Canada and Greenland when they can strike from friendly waters, is difficult to comprehend. Even if such an eventuality were to arise, a Northern Base in Canada's Arctic would do little to counter this threat.

While it is indeed possible that further development of ALCM (Air-Launched Cruise Missile) technology and the potential for development of new active ballistic missile defence systems may revive the importance of the Canadian North for the defence of North America, these possibilities will have to be dealt with under the NORAD framework.[53] A Northern Base of Beattie's conception would do nothing to strengthen the vulnerable Northern Flank of NATO, nor would it really serve the protection of North America.

The next two authors to consider are Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky who co-authored an article in 1979 which followed quite closely the themes articulated by Franklyn Griffiths.[54] In this article they advocate a comprehensive restructuring of the Canadian Forces to better contribute to the NATO Alliance. Jockel and Sokolsky suggest that instead of attempting to contribute very little to several NATO tasks, Canada should limit its liabilities and concentrate on emphasizing its strategic advantages. The major recommendation is that the CFE (Canadian Forces Europe) should be brought home and Canada should

---

[53]For a fuller discussion of the implications of these new technologies, see D. Cox, "Canadian-American Military Relations: Present Trends and Future Possibilities," International Journal, Vol. 36, No. 1, Winter 1980-81.

[54]J. T. Jockel and J. J. Sokolsky, "Emphasising the Assets: A Proposal for the restructuring of Canada's military contribution to NATO," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2, Autumn 1979, pp. 17-20.

discontinue its role along the Central Front.[55] In order to justify this redeployment, Jockel and Sokolsky adapt George Lindsey's generalization that Canada's greatest strategic asset in terms of European defence is its geography. The rationale for this view is that "(a)ll strategic sea lanes from North America to Europe pass along the Canadian coast for some 1,000 miles."[56] They suggest that "...Canada ought to expand its contribution to the maritime defence of the North Atlantic."[57]

Having stated unequivocally that Canada's logical role in NATO should involve the participation in maritime defence, the two authors outline three ways in which Canada could enhance the security of the North Atlantic. The first would involve attacking the Soviet submarine bases located in the Kola Peninsula, the second would be to impede the transit of Soviet naval forces through the GIUK Gap, and the third would be to provide local ASW in the vicinity of convoys.[58] In order to facilitate these three objectives, Jockel and Sokolsky advocate the acquisition of additional DDH-280 Tribal Class Helicopter Destroyers and the acquisition of a number of nuclear attack submarines.[59] To finance these procurements, it would be necessary to abandon the programme to build six new frigates. Support for the surface element of Canada's ASW force would be provided through the basing of LRPA Aurouras and NFA F-18 aircraft at Keflavik in Iceland.

---

[55] Ibid., p. 17

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., p. 18

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

To allow for this restructuring of the Canadian commitment to NATO, Jockel and Sokolsky advocate the dropping of the commitment to the Central Front altogether. They believe that "... the withdrawal from Germany would not be undertaken as part of a cutback in the Canadian commitment to NATO." [60] The forces withdrawn from the Central Front would be used in support of a continued commitment to Norway and the Northern Flank through an enhanced CAST Group. While it is clear that Jockel and Sokolsky appreciate the significance of the Northern Flank for the security of NATO, it does not appear that they come to grips with the problems inherent in Canada's role in attempting to defend that region. The two authors apparently take the view of Franklyn Griffiths when they suggest that the commitment to Norway can be fulfilled from bases in Canada. [61] This,however, flies in the face of evidence presented earlier that the nature of the Soviet threat is such that forces based in Canada are largely irrelevant for deterrent value, and would be unlikely to arrive in time to influence the course of events in a crisis situation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that such a view would find support in either Washington or Brussels.

Although Jockel and Sokolsky recognize that Canada's commitment to Norway should,in theory, provide some deterrent value, their suggestions with regard to a Canadian based commitment will not fulfill this requirement. The concept of protection of the Northern Flank as a deterrent to the Soviet Union's strategic goals in the North represents an important element of their strategic position. Despi

---

[60] Ibid., p. 20.

[61] Ibid.

this, Jockel and Sokolsky advocate a role for Canada in tactical ASW in the North Atlantic, a role clearly designed to assist NATO in actual wartime. Although there is nothing inherently wrong in this, it would seem to make more sense for Canada to attempt to fulfill a role which could prevent a maturing crisis from developing into a full-scale conflict. Jockel and Sokolsky, in their desire to restructure Canada's commitment to NATO, are ignoring the element of deterrence in their equation.

Since their collaborative effort, it may be inferred that Jockel and Sokolsky have parted ways. Sokolsky, writing in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings continues to advocate an increased Canadian naval participation in the North Atlantic, while Jockel, writing in International Perspectives emphasizes the importance of the commitment to Norway.[62] Sokolsky's position remains essentially unchanged and is subject to the same criticisms and objections voiced above. Jockel, on the other hand, seems to have altered his position somewhat. In a review of Canada's commitment to the defence of Norway, Jockel recognizes the significance of the defence of Norway to the security of NATO's Northern Flank, points out the problems which mitigate against the effective fulfillment of Canada's role, and suggests some ways to enhance the capability of reinforcing Norway in a crisis.

---

[62]Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada's Future in NATO," USNI Proceedings, Vol. 106, January 1, 1980, pp. 66-73; Joseph T. Jockel, "Canada's Other Commitment: The Defence of Norway," International Perspectives, January/February 1980, pp. 21-24.

Jockel's analysis of the situation along NATO's Northern Flank begins with a consideration of three potential conflict scenarios. The first would involve a sudden Soviet attack limited to Norway alone, which would preclude the ability of Canada to deliver the CAST Group at all. According to Jockel, however, such a situation is unlikely in that it would result in a "...direct clash with the United States including the possibility of escalation to general war. The occupation of Norway is not worth the risk."[63] The second scenario involves "...a Soviet attack on Norway in support of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Germany...[a scenario which] many strategic commentators view as more probable."[64] The attack would be limited to approximately 15,000 men and air, land and sea strikes carried out during the first week of the war. Jockel feels that the "...chances of deploying the CAST combat group would again be small."[65] The third scenario which Jockel outlines is "...one in which the Soviet Union subjects Norway alone to a lengthy [sic] series of stated threats...coupled with provocative gestures."[66] In this scenario Jockel believes that the Norwegian response might include calling upon Canada to send the CAST Group in support of Norwegian moves to counter the Soviets.[67]

Faced with these three possibilities, Jockel deems it necessary to enhance the capability of the CAST Group to arrive early

---

[63] Jockel, Ibid., p. 23.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

enough to make a positive contribution. He suggests more comprehensive prepositioning of equipment and more frequent deployments of the CAST Group to Norway as the solution.[68] Whether these measures are adequate depends on the scenario. If Jockel's third scenario is the only one considered, then perhaps the CAST Group in its present form is sufficient. If, however, either of the other two becomes a reality, then the CAST Group would be for all intents and purposes irrelevant. This is a risk not addressed by Jockel.

The next author to be examined is Nicholas Tracy, another advocate of a Northern Base Option. Tracy, in a monograph prepared for the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Department of National Defence, puts together one of the most comprehensive arguments for a Northern Base Option in support of Canada's commitment to NATO's Northern Flank.[69] Tracy's argument is very similar to the views presented by Franklyn Griffiths, although it is much more specific in its recommendations. The essence of Tracy's argument is that

> ...cooperation between Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Iceland and Norway at various levels of military effort can achieve a degree of political cohesion that will serve each of the states involved, and promote the general good of NATO.[70]

Like Griffiths, Tracy is greatly concerned with the perceived American threat. "The greatest threat to Canadian authority in the Arctic may

---

[68] Ibid., p. 24.

[69] Nicholas Tracy, Canada's Foreign Policy Objectives and Canadian Security Arrangements in the North (Ottawa: DND ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 8, February 1980).

[70] Ibid., p. i.

well come from the United States."[71] In order to buttress Canada's position in the Arctic, Tracy argues that "...Canadian and Norwegian military cooperation in Arctic Norway and Arctic Canada will automatically support the claims each makes for its individual sovereign control in the Arctic."[72]

Having set the general tone of Tracy's position, it is now possible to turn to a closer examination of the methods by which Tracy proposes that this goal be secured. Tracy sees four objectives which must be met in order for this Arctic defence cooperative to become a reality. These objectives are:

1) Continued support for NATO's efforts to guarantee the North Atlantic sea line of communication.
2) Continued and improved support for Norway's effort to stabilize the security environment in the Norwegian and Barents sea area.
3) Support for the pro-NATO elements in Iceland.
4) Improved ability to control Canada's own Arctic territory and air space.[73]

The programme which Tracy outlines to meet his stated objectives would include the following:

1) The construction of a base in the Canadian Arctic within easy air distance of Norway.
2) The prestocking of part of the CAST Group's heavy equipment in North Norway.
3) Basing an interceptor force of fighter aircraft at the Canadian Arctic base.
4) Increased exchanges of troops between Canada, Norway, Denmark and Iceland in order to foster a sense of common cause among the small arctic states.

---

[71] Ibid., p. 59.

[72] Ibid., p. 62.

[73] Ibid., p. 79.

5) The Canadian Armed Forces taking over responsibility for fisheries surveillance in northern waters and the development of a northern ASW capability.

6) The opening of a Canadian embassy in Iceland to foster further contacts at all levels.[74]

We must now examine in some detail the viability of such a programme. Tracy's proposals are plausible, but run up against a number of practical obstacles. The first and most formidable involves the difficulty in altering or suspending Canada's role along the Central Front. Tracy recognizes this obstacle when he states that the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Germany could be interpreted in Europe "...as demonstrating that Canada no longer believed in the American strategic deterrent and was leaving the sinking ship in good time."[75] Later Tracy goes on to emphasize that "...any appearance of reduction of Canadian Forces in Europe could be catastrophic...because ground forces are fundamental to the commitment value of Canada's forces."[76] To this objection, Tracy has no answer except to say that "...although no change is possible in Canada's present European commitment, neither is any substantial change sought."[77]

A second obstacle, one which stems in part from the first, is an economic obstacle. According to Tracy, "...so greatly does the German government value the Canadian military commitment that it has made Canadian preferential access to Common Market trade dependent upon the continuation of the commitment."[78] Recalling the rathe-

---

[74] Ibid., pp. 93-94.

[75] Ibid., p. 67.

[76] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

[77] Ibid., p. 74.

[78] Ibid., p. 69.

protracted debate in Canada during the early and mid seventies concerning the desirability of a Contractual Link with the European Communities in fulfillment of the Third Option in Canadian trade policy, it is difficult to foresee Canada opening up that issue again. Tracy defers to this view when he states that

> (t)he dependence of trade connections upon a satisfactory political order is only one facet of the general interdependence of state interests, which as presently constituted provide a powerful incentive for the continuance of Canadian political and military commitment to west European security ...the severance of the political ties across the Atlantic would make Canada, out of concern for security within the narrow perimeter of North America, significantly more vulnerable to American control.[79]

Despite the military, political and economic obstacles which stand in the way, obstacles which Tracy himself recognizes, he proceeds to put forward the programme for a Northern security policy outlined above. This programme, as well as being subject to the same practical objections raised with respect to the other proposals for a Canadian Arctic Base, raises a much more fundamental question with regard to the Canadian commitment to Europe in general, and to the Northern Flank in particular. The question involves the deterrent value of the Canadian Forces. According to Nils Ørvik, Canadian Forces in Europe are seen "...as a guarantee of an automatic Canadian involvement if the Soviets should attack Western Europe. Their value as a political deterrent exceeds by far their potential military functions."[80] While this is essentially correct, in the final analysis, the deterrent is only as good as its perceived military utility.

---

[79] Ibid., p. 70.

[80] Nils Ørvik, Canada's Northern Security: The Eastern Dimension, op. cit., p. 42.

Ørvik's view, which will be developed more fully later, is that the deterrent value depends on Canadian forces being present in Europe. A commitment without a concrete, on-site presence in Europe is no commitment at all, particularly when the ability to deliver the earmarked forces is subject to interdiction by the Soviet Union.

In summary, proponents of a Northern Base in Canada as a means to fulfill the Canadian commitment to the Northern Flank fail to appreciate the deterrent value of European based Canadian forces, fail to appreciate the difficulties posed by the enhanced nature of the Soviet threat along the Northern Flank, and fail to provide a viable alternative. With this in mind, this study will now focus on the views of Nils Ørvik, one of the most persistent advocates of a renewed Northern Commitment.

CHAPTER IV

THE NORTHERN BASE OPTION: EUROPE

Nils Ørvik has over the past two decades expressed a continuing concern for the security of NATO's Northern Flank. He has suggested several alternatives by which the security of this region could be enhanced. It is precisely because of this long-term interest which Ørvik displays that his ideas and writings on this issue will be examined separately. A second and perhaps more fundamental reason for this separate analysis stems from the fact that Ørvik, unlike the other writers covered in the preceding chapter, stresses that Canada's commitment to NATO's Northern Flank can only be fulfilled from the European side of the Atlantic. Bearing this most basic distinction in mind, this chapter will analyse in some detail whether Ørvik's proposals and suggestions are indeed viable options for Canada in attempting to contribute to the security of NATO's Northern Flank.

Ørvik's overall approach to the issue is quite different from those previously discussed. He has developed a framework of analysis which, from a strategic and security point of view is more realistic. It is therefore necessary to outline what that framework entails prior to engaging in a more in-depth analysis. Ørvik's point of departure is to define the threat. Having identified and defined the threat, the next step is to examine the existing situation along NATO's Northern Flank with all the inherent difficulties. Moving

from a general discussion of the security of this region, Ørvik examines quite specifically the Canadian commitment to the Northern Flank. Finding the nature of the present Canadian commitment unsatisfactory, Ørvik examines the alternatives available to Canada and suggests what he feels is the most appropriate course of action. This constitutes Ørvik's framework of analysis, which will be described and assessed throughout the remainder of this chapter.

As early as 1963, Ørvik expressed a concern for the Soviet threat to what is now commonly called NATO's Northern Flank.[1] His analysis is rooted in an historical assessment of Soviet objectives, both general objectives vis-a-vis the West as a whole, and more precise objectives along the Northern Flank.[2] For Ørvik, indeed,for most Western defence analysts, the Soviet's main objective is "...control of Western Europe...(w)ith a firm grip on Western Europe, the Soviet Union could decisively upset the strategic balance."[3] One method by which the Soviet Union could seek to fulfill this objective is to gain control of the strategically vital and extremely vulnerable Northern Flank of NATO. In order to highlight the potential danger in this region, Ørvik points to the growing Soviet military forces in the Kola Peninsula, forces which have taken on an increasingly offensive

---

[1] Nils Ørvik, "Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union" (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 6, 1963). Earlier expressions of this concern by Ørvik exist but this is his first comprehensive account in English.

[2] Ibid., pp. 1-17.

[3] Ibid., p. 1.

complexion as noted in Chapter I of this study. Above and beyond this strictly military threat, Ørvik also considers the politico-psychological threat which the Soviet Union poses in this region.

The politico-psychological threat, while it is difficult to measure precisely, does indeed pose some significant challenges, particularly in Norway. According to Ørvik, "the Soviet political threat has been conceived in terms of national Communist parties that either stage revolutions...or grow large enough to become influential by parliamentary methods."[4] While this may have been the traditional Soviet method of undermining the political foundations of a state, it has yet to prove successful in Norway or other Scandinavian states. A recent article on the Soviet political threat to Northern Europe in Problems of Communism notes that

> (f)or much of the post war period the balance of political forces in the Nordic countries has not favoured Soviet interests. Specifically, the USSR has not been able to rely on local Communist parties as effective instruments for its policies. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden for example, the local Communist parties have been weak and isolated, in recent years gaining no more than 6 percent of the votes cast in parliamentary elections.[5]

Having been frustrated in their traditional approach, the Soviets have begun to rely upon what Ørvik calls the "charm campaign".[6] This approach

---

[4]Nils Ørvik, "Soviet Approaches on NATO's Northern Flank," International Journal, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 1965/66, p. 62. For a recent in-depth analysis of the Soviet political threat, see Trond Gilberg et al., "The Soviet Union and Northern Europe," Problems of Communism, Vol. 30, No. 2, March/April 1981, pp. 1-24.

[5]Gilberg et al., ibid., pp. 7-8.

[6]Ørvik, "Soviet Approaches on NATO's Northern Flank," ibid., p. 63.

involves the building of fairly extensive ties with local Norwegian officials in the hope that the image of a "...wealthy, benevolent and, above all, friendly and generous neighbour...might result in greater conformity to Soviet demands."[7]

The dangers faced by Norway vis-a-vis the Soviet military and political approaches stem, according to Ørvik, from a sense of isolation.[8] Isolated both geographically and politically from the mainstream of NATO, Norway is in an extremely vulnerable position. This then is the main threat to Norway and the Northern Flank of NATO. Canada, as a member of NATO and as a Northern state, has committed itself to contributing to the security of this vital region. For Ørvik, the rationale behind this commitment involves an assessment of the threat on two levels. The first level is to determine whether the situation along the Northern Flank poses a direct threat to Canadian security, while the second level involves an analysis of the indirect threat.

According to Ørvik, "...it is very hard if not impossible for any nation to establish a rational defence posture without having first defined the dangers that threaten the nation's security."[9] In defining this threat, Ørvik states that "...the Soviet Union does pose a military threat to Canada's national security and our defence planning must be made on that basic assumption."[10] This being the basic premise for

---

[7] Ibid., p. 63.

[8] Ibid., p. 66.

[9] Nils Ørvik, Canadian Defence Policy: Choices and Directions (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, National Security Series No. 2/80, 1980), p. 4.

[10] Ibid., p. 5.

Canadian defence policy in the past, Ørvik then turns to consider whether the Soviet Union still poses a direct threat to Canadian national security or not. In the short-term, Ørvik believes that "...(w)ith large oceans both to the west and to the east, a frozen wasteland in the north...the danger of a direct threat to the Canadian homeland has never seriously been considered."[11] Taking a longer term perspective of ten to fifteen years, however, Ørvik suggests that the Soviet Union may indeed pose a direct threat to Canada. He cites two reasons to support this view. "First, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has confirmed the pattern of Soviet military strategy which has emerged gradually throughout the post-war period."[12] This pattern involves Soviet aggression towards states which share a common border with the Soviet Union. While Ørvik concedes that Canada is buffered from the Soviet Union, he argues that "...as our perception of 'natural barriers' and physical inaccessibility are rapidly changing,"[13] this situation may also change.

The second reason which Ørvik believes may lead to a longer term direct Soviet threat to Canada "...is the dynamic technological development which is about to transform all northern environments."[14] These developments have led to an increasing Soviet pressure along the GIUK Gap and an increasing Soviet presence in the North, developments

---

[11] Ibid., p. 5.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., p. 5. For a more in-depth analysis of the changing nature of perceptions of geography in the North, see Nils Ørvik (ed.), Report from Conference on Canada and the Northern Rim (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, National Security Series No. 6/77, 1977).

[14] Ibid., p. 6.

which may result in Canada falling into the category of a neighbouring state of the Soviet Union. "If the present trends continue, with the Soviet Union trying to extend its control westward along the rim of the Arctic Ocean, one cannot exclude a future potential threat to the Canadian homeland."[15] These then are the reasons Ørvik suggests for considering the future direct threat to Canadian security which the Soviet Union may pose. While this is a longer term consideration of Canadian defence policy, Ørvik is more concerned with what he calls the indirect threat.

Ørvik suggests that Canada has historically recognized and met the indirect threat in both World War I and World War II, and that our present commitment to NATO is an extension of this historical tradition. According to Ørvik, the indirect threat "...was duly recognized in the short-term perspective as directed not against the national territory but against a friend and one time protector whose possible defeat in the long-term also threatens Canada's national security and way of life."[16] While this view prevailed during the post-war period up until the late 1960s, the period coinciding with the foreign policy review and the defence policy review of the first Trudeau Government cast a shadow over Canada's commitment to meet the indirect threat. It is not possible to discuss the foreign and defence policy reviews within the framework of this study, but it is essential to discuss some of the fundamental questions which arose out of the reviews and the subsequent policy statements.

---

[15] Ibid., p. 7.

[16] Ibid., p. 8.

Ørvik asserts that the two most basic questions arising from the reviews involve the continued presence of the Canadian Forces in Europe. The first question, in essence political, derives from the view of some Canadian defence analysts that Canada should withdraw its forces from Europe altogether.[17] This is an unrealistic proposition which would be unacceptable in Washington or NATO and Ørvik questions whether it would be politically feasible for Canada to withdraw. He states that a unilateral withdrawal "...would imply prohibitive political costs."[18] The costs, although difficult to measure with a high degree of certainty, would involve "...a hard blow to the economic policy which has been patiently pursued in Canada's recent rapprochement to the European Community."[19] A second cost would be paid in the political cohesion of NATO. According to Ørvik, Canada's forces in Europe have a symbolic value which far outweighs their military contribution. A withdrawal of these forces would "give fresh ammunition to the neutralist, defeatist forces...in many NATO countries. It would cause too many complications for very marginal gains."[20]

The second question which Ørvik raises vis-a-vis a withdrawal from Europe is whether a withdrawal would be in Canada's interests. Ørvik agai maintains that the answer to this question must be negative.[21]

---

[17]Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, discussed in the previous chapter, are representative of this view when they suggest that Canada should dissolve CFE and bring them back to Canada. "Emphasising the Assets," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2, Autumn 1979, p. 17.

[18]Ørvik, Canadian Defence Policy: Choices and Directions, op. cit., p. 9.

[19]Ibid., p. 9.

[20]Ibid., p. 10.

[21]Ibid., p. 10.

Here he bases his argument on military grounds, suggesting that participation in the European theatre provides valuable training with the NATO partners, training that would not likely be available in Canada. Ørvik also contends that "...(i)t is in our own interest, and also in the interest of our European allies, to counter the threat as far to the east as possible."[22] In Ørvik's view, the Northern Flank and the Central Front constitute the front line for the defence of Canada and "(f)rom a Canadian point of view, the wider the 'forefield', the farther from the home base the threat is being met, the more depth to the nations defence."[23]

Having examined in general terms Ørvik's definition of the threat to Canada's national security, it is now possible to turn to an examination of his view of the existing security arrangements along NATO's Northern Flank, including Canada's commitment to an area which he believes constitutes a front line for Canadian security. Ørvik's assessment of the security of the Northern Flank under the present circumstances leads him to state that Soviet moves in this region "... would - from a Soviet point of view - have many attractions."[24] This stems in the main from the well-known and in Ørvik's words "basically irrational"[25] Norwegian policy banning bases and nuclear weapons from

---

[22] Ibid., p. 15.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Nils Ørvik, "Canada and North Atlantic Security," in C. Bertram and J. J. Holst (eds.), New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic (Guildford: IPC Press, 1977), p. 78.

[25] Ørvik, Canadian Defence Policy: Choices and Directions, op. cit., p. 13.

Norwegian soil. Compounding this problem is the lack of sizeable Norwegian military forces to counteract the large and growing power of the Soviet Union in the North. If NATO is unable to deter the Soviet Union along the Northern Flank, the political climate in Norway may change to such an extent that Norway may adopt a neutralist policy. This, according to Ørvik, would have profound effects for the security of Western Europe and, by extension, Canada. For Ørvik,

> (t)he task at hand in Canada is not a scramble to fight off an invasion of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland or Baffin Island, but a cool, hard assessment of the indirect threat and long-term consequences of the Soviet westward move which is no longer a remote contingency, but a hard fact.[26]

Having outlined the threat and its implications for Western security, Ørvik then turns to an assessment of the present Canadian contribution to the defence of the Northern Flank. He is highly critical of the weakness in the commitment of the CAST Group to Norway: "...it seems very unlikely...that the Canadian CAST Combat Force will be able to get to North Norway in time to deter and prevent the area from being controlled by the Soviet Union."[27] Ørvik is not alone in drawing this conclusion, but where he diverges from the others is over his suggestions for making the Canadian commitment to the Northern Flank a viable one. His main suggestion, one which he has consistently advocated over the years, is that for the CAST Force to provide

---

[26] Ørvik, "Canada and North Atlantic Security," op. cit., p. 79.

[27] Nils Ørvik, "Doctrines and National Security: A Canadian Defence Doctrine?," in Ørvik (ed.), Canada and NATO (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, National Security Series No. 3/82, 1982), p. 120.

a credible deterrent function it must be "...in some...location on the European side of the Atlantic Ocean."[28] This being the basic premise of Ørvik's suggestion for a viable and credible Canadian commitment to the security of NATO's Northern Flank, this study will turn to an examination of these various suggestions.

As far back as 1967, Ørvik suggested a realignment within the overall structure of NATO in order to address the problem of the security of the Northern Flank.[29] This suggested realignment involved the creation of a North Sea Groupment composed of the NATO countries bordering on the North Sea. Such a grouping would, according to Ørvik, have served both military and political ends. Militarily, the increased coordination and cooperation of a North Sea Groupment would heighten the awareness of these states to the vulnerable nature of the Northern Flank, while politically the increased cohesion among the various states would serve to reinforce the political will and determination in the face of the increasing Soviet threat. Ørvik stated that "...the axis of the whole system would continue to be the United States and Canada,"[30] but a North Sea Groupment would bolster what is an increasingly vital region for the Alliance as a whole.

One decade later Ørvik expanded on this idea of a North Sea Groupment and advocated the creation of an Arctic Command to fulfill

---

[28] Ibid., p. 128.

[29] Nils Ørvik, "A North Sea Alternative," Military Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, January 1967, pp. 78-85.

[30] Ibid., p. 85.

the security needs of this region. A NATO Arctic Command, based in the Shetland Islands off Scotland would, in Ørvik's view, "serve a political as well as a functional purpose in focusing attention on new aspects of North Atlantic defence."[31] Politically a NATO Arctic Command would indicate to the Soviet Union that NATO is aware of the importance of the Northern Flank and the North Atlantic, while at the same time it would be mutually supportive of the Northern members of NATO. Ørvik also suggests that a NATO Arctic Command would have benefits for Canadian attitudes towards national security. Canadian involvement in such a Command would highlight for Canada the importance of the Northern Flank and Northeast Atlantic to the nation's security and would "...make national defence and Canada's Atlantic responsibilities a more significant issue than they are today."[32]

While Ørvik concedes that there would no doubt be difficulties in establishing such an Arctic Command, he proceeds to suggest how such a Command could be made operational. The task to be met by the Arctic Command is clear; defence of the Northern Flank through deterring Soviet moves farther West, and protection of the vital sea and air lanes of the North Atlantic. To meet this task, Ørvik believes that it is absolutely essential for a Northern Base to be set up east of the GIUK Gap. According tc Ørvik, there are several possible locations for such a base, but the mos- attractive site would be an island in the north of Scotland. Such a base would provide "...the necessary

---

[31] Ørvik, "Canada and North Atlantic Security," op. cit., p. 84.

[32] Ibid., p. 84.

facilities for highly trained, highly mobile special service strike forces to be dispatched at very short notice for rapid, pre-crisis deployments or for actual defence tasks in Norway or other threatened spots in the rim area."[33] An integral part of the idea of this Northern Base would involve relocating the CAST Force on a permanent basis to the site in northern Scotland. Combined with other NATO forces tasked for the defence of the Northern Flank, Ørvik believes that this would provide the deterrent function that is deemed to be so vital.

On purely military grounds, the idea of a Northern Base in Scotland would provide a possible option for ensuring the security of NATO's Northern Flank. It would certainly lend credibility to the CAST commitment to North Norway. Such a base would be only a matter of a few hours flying time from the deployment areas, and even with limited prestocking the CAST Group could be in place prior to the outbreak of hostilities, despite the constraints imposed by reduced warning time.[34] Nevertheless, to lend credibility to the CAST commitment, the base itself would have to be made virtually invulnerable, a difficult undertaking. Moreover, on financial grounds, the cost of such a scheme may prove to be prohibitive. NATO is currently hard pressed to meet its present commitments, let alone take on an additional, and initially expensive task. It would also entail the financially

---

[33] Ørvik, Canadian Defence Policy: Choices and Directions, op. cit., p. 22.

[34] Ørvik, "Doctrines and National Security: A Canadian Defence Doctrine?," op. cit., pp. 129-134.

strapped Canadian Armed Forces stationing a large number of men and their equipment outside Canada. This would mean that these men and the equipment would not be available for other tasks. While it is true that the Senate Subcommitte on National Defence has recently recommended increasing the size of the Canadian Armed Forces and the acquisition of additional equipment,[35] it is not clear that a Northern Base in Scotland would be viewed as a priority. On these grounds then, it appears unlikely that a Northern Base of Ørvik's conception will become a reality. Having said this, however, the question which must be asked is what is to become of Canada's commitment to NATO's Northern Flank? Under the complex set of circumstances which dominate and determine the security of the Northern Flank, is it at all possible for Canada to fulfill its stated commitment to this region? If it is deemed impossible under these circumstances, should the commitment be dropped?

These are hard questions which demand difficult choices. On the one hand, it may be expedient to avoid making these choices and continue in the tradition of pragmatism, making adjustments as the situation warrants. On the other hand, to paraphrase an oft-quoted and even more oft-ignored aphorism, putting that which is expedient at the heart of the nation's defence is surely a great folly. With this caution in mind, it is the final task of this chapter to attempt to determine whether Canada can indeed fulfill this commitment to NATO's Northern Flank.

---

[35]Canada, Senate, Subcommittee on National Defence, First Report (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1982), pp. ix-x. Recommendations #4, 9.

In response to this challenge, Ørvik has recently proposed a potential solution to the problem. It is a solution which recognizes the unique problems of Canada's commitment to European security, both along the Northern Flank as well as in the Central Front region. Ørvik suggests that Canada, in consultation with NATO, establish a base facility in Schleswig-Holstein in northern Germany, a base which would serve two purposes. One purpose would be a renewed commitment to the Central Front. This would involve relocating the 4 CMBG from its present position at Lahr in southern Germany to the north, a region which is at the present time vulnerable. Ørvik believes that such a move would be welcomed by NATO. Militarily such a move makes considerable sense. Strengthening the defences near the North German Plain would go some distance in frustrating Soviet objectives. Recalling that one of the Soviet objectives in any concerted attack along the Northern Flank would involve a push up the Jutland Peninsula to gain control of the Baltic Approaches, an increased defensive capability in this region would be of considerable benefit. The second purpose of a base located in Schleswig-Holstein would be to provide a permanent station for the CAST Group in their task in defending the Northern Flank. The CAST Group permanently stationed at such a base would be fairly close to its deployment position in north Norway. It would be able to respond quickly to any eventuality along the Northern Flank, which was and should remain the raison d'etre for this commitment.

On military grounds then, such a move seems to offer a solution to Canada's dilemma of having two European commitments, both of which are difficult to live up to. This is not to suggest that such

a move would be a simple matter. It would involve considerable cost in constructing the infrastructure for the base. It would also involve an adjustment for NATO to replace the 4 CMBG in Lahr, and a readjustment of the Canadian air contingent in Germany. The proximity of the base to the German Democratic Republic would make it an obvious Soviet target in a conflict, with predictably high casualties for the Canadian forces. Finally, it would entail considerable expense on Canada's behalf through the stationing of the CAST Group in Europe on a permanent base, although in the long run it could be money well spent. Ørvik believes that "... these expenses in the economic sector would be amply compensated by substantial gains in the military and political areas."[36] Politically, benefits would accrue in both Europe and Canada. In Europe NATO is suffering a number of strains. A higher profile Canadian presence would reaffirm the trans-Atlantic ties upon which NATO is based. In Canada, a high-profile, hopefully credible commitment could serve to increase awareness of the importance of the roles in Europe. In addition, there may be economic benefits stemming from the ties with the European Community, but this would require careful preparation, analysis and action. Although these are for the most part, benefits which are difficult to measure precisely, they would not be inconsiderable. For these reasons, the suggestion of a base in Schleswig-Holstein capable of fulfilling the limited but important commitments to the Northern Flank and to the Central Front is to be preferred over the proposals outlined in the previous chapter.

Ørvik's proposals for an increased Canadian capability and

---

[36] Ørvik, "Doctrines and National Security: A Canadian Defence Doctrine?", op. cit., p. 131.

commitment along the Northern Flank of NATO are more attractive than those of analysts who suggest that this role can be fulfilled from the Canadian north. Ørvik's proposals, nevertheless, are not without difficulty. The most fundamental difficulty inherent in Ørvik's proposal for a base facility is that it addresses only part of the problem of the Soviet threat to NATO's Northern Flank. This problem is a basic problem in defence policy planning, particularly in the context of an alliance relationship. It involves the dilemma of deterence versus war-fighting capability. Ørvik's suggestion of a base would go some distance to improve NATO's deterrent capability along the Northern Flank, although whether it would improve NATO's ability to protect the Northern Flank in the event of hostilities is another matter altogether.

The major difficulty which is most evident concerns the location of the proposed base facility. Neither of Ørvik's suggestions as to the location of such a base is ideal. Bearing in mind the importance of the Northern Flank for Soviet strategy, these bases would become primary targets for Soviet attack. On the one hand, a base located on an island off the coast of Scotland would be a highly visible and highly vulnerable target for the growing Soviet air power in the Kola Peninsula. Just as a base in Scotland would reduce the time needed to put the CAST Force on the ground in Norway, so would it reduce the time needed for the Soviet's to launch air strikes on that base. Recalling that the Soviet Union views control of the Northern Flank as a critical objective in its overall strategic planning, any base designed to frustrate their objectives in the North would

undoubtedly be subjected to punishing attacks, probably before the men and equipment there could be transported to their deployment positions in Norway.

On the other hand, with respect to the suggestion of a Canadian base located in Schleswig-Holstein designed to fulfill both the commitment to the Central Front and the commitment to the Northern Flank, it too would be highly vulnerable although for different reasons. Schleswig-Holstein, astride the North German Plain, is quite close to the NATO-Warsaw Pact Frontier. The terrain of this region is ideal for massive armoured thrusts, a tactic which the Soviet's have worked long and hard to perfect. In light of the present NATO-Warsaw Pact force balance in this region, it would not be untoward to expect NATO defences in this region to be overrun shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. While it may indeed be possible that the CAST Group could be transported to Norway prior to the base being overrun, this is by no means a certainty. The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) are all Category I, meaning that they are fully equipped and that they maintain eight-five percent of their wartime establishment of manpower.[37] These troops are equipped with the most advanced Soviet weaponry and their training is geared primarily for a lightening-like armoured thrust into NATO territory. A NATO base facility in Schleswig-Holstein might not remain in NATO's hands for long.

---

[37]Henry Stanhope, "New Threats - or Old Fears," in Derek Leebaert (ed.), European Security: Prospects for the 1980s (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1979), p. 49.

For these reasons then, the idea of a base for the CAST Group in either of these locations, while serving a potential deterrent function, would not in the event of hostilities, necessarily serve to enhance NATO's war-fighting capability.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The security of NATO's Northern Flank is a factor which is now being recognized as increasingly vital to the security of the Western Alliance as a whole. In the past NATO's Flanks, both in the North and the South were viewed by NATO policy-makers and planners as being of secondary importance. By far the greatest attention was focused on the more highly visible Central Front. That this situation is changing is as much a factor of the enhanced nature of the Soviet threat along the Northern Flank as any other factor.

An examination of certain historical and geographical factors reveals that the Soviet Union places a great deal of emphasis on the Northern European region. It perceives its strategic interests in this region as being vital to the security of the Soviet Union as a whole. In light of this perception, the Soviety Union has built up a large military presence in the North which is designed to achieve supremacy along the Northern Flank of NATO. The very nature of the Soviet threat is structured to attack the vital and vulnerable GIUK Gap. If the Soviets are capable of breaking out through the GIUK Gap, the SLOCs on which NATO relies to reinforce Europe may be open to attack and interdiction.

The consequences of such an occurrence, although difficult to determine precisely, would certainly pose major obstacles to NATO's ability to prevent the Soviet Union from turning NATO's Northern Flank with all the inherent difficulties this would create for NATO strategy as a whole.

If this is an accurate assessment of the situation along the Northern Flank, and the evidence would seem to indicate that it is, then Canada's commitment to the security of this region is clearly inadequate. The commitment of the CAST Group to Norway was designed to fulfill a deterrent function and, should deterrence fail, attempt to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control of the Northern Flank. While this is an essential element of NATO strategy, the enhanced nature of the Soviet threat to this region makes it unlikely that the CAST Group will be able to fulfill its role adequately.

The problems confronting the Canadian commitment are threefold. First, because the Soviet military forces in this region are designed for rapid attack, the warning time available to NATO will be drastically reduced. This, when coupled with the Norwegian ban on the establishment of foreign military bases on Norwegian territory, makes it highly unlikely that the CAST Group will make it to Norway intact. If it in fact does manage to cross the Atlantic, it is more than likely that it will arrive too late, finding its deployment positions in Soviet hands. Finally, the CAST Group is a victim of undermanning and multiple tasking in the Canadian Armed Forces. The CAST Group, as it is presently configured, has only enough men and equipment to begin operations. It has no operational reserves to sustain itself over

even the shortest period of time. If the task of the CAST Group is to assist in countering the Soviet threat, it must be restructured, for it is clearly inadequate to meet the enhanced Soviet threat.

In response to the recognized fact that the CAST Group is unable to meet its commitment to NATO's Northern Flank, a small group of Canadian defence analysts have suggested that a Northern Base Option may be appropriate for a renewed commitment to this vital region. As we have seen, one group takes the view that it is possible for Canada to fulfill its Northern Flank commitment from a Northern Base located in Canada. On the other hand, Nils Ørvik, who is the sole exponent of the other approach, maintains that it is only possible to fulfill this commitment from a base on the European side of the Atlantic.

Neither of these options is wholly satisfactory for a number of reasons. Those who argue for a Canadian Northern Base do so primarily in response to questions which arise over the lack of Canadian capabilities in the Arctic. They suggest it would be possible for a Canadian Northern Base to fulfill both the defence of the Canadian Arctic and the commitment to NATO's Northern Flank. While it may indeed be possible for a Canadian Northern Base to serve a role in the Canadian North, it is virtually impossible for the CAST Group, stationed in Northern Canada, to serve a role in the defence of the Northern Flank. The CAST Group, based anywhere in Canada, is still faced with the obstacles which prevent it from fulfilling the commitmen

to the Northern Flank under the present circumstances. A Canadian Northern Base does nothing to overcome these obstacles.

Nils Ørvik's suggestion of a Northern Base on the European side of the Atlantic, while considerably more attractive and realistic, is also subject to difficulties. Although Ørvik's suggestion would certainly overcome the problem of bringing the CAST Group close enough to its deployment positions in Norway to fulfill a potential deterrent function, his suggestion creates its own unique problem. Ørvik's proposed locations for such a base would bring the base within range of Soviet air and naval attack, likely resulting in the destruction of much of the CAST Group before its deployment to Northern Norway.

The two sets of options which have been discus ed throughout the course of this study, a commitment based in Canada and a commitment based in Europe, do not appear to be viable. Having said this then, the question which remains is whet r it is at all possible for Canada under the present circumstances to fulfill credibly its commitment to NATO's Northern Flank. In attempting to answer this question, the operative phrase is clearly "under the present circumstances". NATO, and Canada in particular, is forced to operate under the restrictions imposed by the Norwegian government. The Norwegian policy banning the establishment of foreign bases or the permanent stationing of foreign troops makes it very difficult for Canada to contribute effectively to the security of NATO's vital Northern Flank.

Faced with these obstacles, the question still stands as to whether the Canadian commitment to the Northern Flank can be made effective. It has been suggested, most recently by R. B. Byers, that

Canada's commitment of the CAST Group should be phased out.[1] Dropping the commitment altogether is certainly not the solution to the problem. This would only serve to further isolate Norway from the mainstream of the Alliance, and further call into question Canada's overall commitment to NATO. Such a move would be tantamount to conceding the vital Northern Flank to the Soviet Union with all the negative implications this would hold for Western security. Reorienting the commitment along the lines suggested by those analysts covered in this study would merely be tinkering with what is clearly an unrealistic commitment. While this is certainly more palatable from an Alliance perspective than the dropping of the commitment, it does not address the root of the problem and is therefore not an ideal solution in itself.

It would appear then, that under the present conditions and circumstances, the Canadian commitment, whatever its configuration, is untenable. To make the existing commitment viable is beyond Canada's limited military resources. A commitment based on a Northern Base located in Canada, as suggested by some, is of dubious military value. A European based commitment, while of greater military significance, raises its own particular difficulties.

---

[1] R.B. Byers, "Defence 81: The Strategic Environment For Canada", in B. MacDonald(ed.), Parliament and Defence Policy: Preparedness or Procrastination? (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 25.

While this might be taken to indicate that Canada's commitment to the security of the Northern Flank will continue to pose ongoing problems, there remains one particular aspect of this situation which needs to be examined, even if only speculatively. That question is, under what set of conditions and circumstances could Canada effectively contribute to the security of NATO's Northern Flank ? That Canada must maintain a commitment to the Northern Flank is beyond doubt. Erik Solem has made this point abundantly clear when he stated that "... it would be... in our interest, as well as that of the Western Alliance - to say nothing of Norway's - that we support her to our fullest." [2] This must be the basic premise of any Canadian policy designed to contribute to the security of the Northern Flank. Up to the present Canada has been unable to fulfill this commitment due to the problematic circumstances flowing from Norway's position within the Alliance and from a neglect of the state of the Canadian Armed Forces. It should not be taken from the experience of the past however, that this situation will remain an immutable factor in the security equation of the Northern Flank.

Within the context of a changed or changing strategic environment, Norway may find itself forced to reconsider its

---

[2] E. Solem, "Energy and Changing Strategic Aspects of Canada's Arctic Regions", Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol, 11, No. 3, Winter 1981/82, p. 24.

position in NATO, and Canadian defence policy planners would do well to consider this possibility in advance. [3] In light of the growing Soviet military power in the North, it is becoming increasingly difficult to view Soviet intentions as solely defensive in nature. It has been maintained throughout the course of this study that Norway is vital to the defence of the Northern Flank and, by extension, to the integrity of the Alliance as a whole. If Norway becomes convinced that the Soviet Union has more than strictly defensive intentions in the North, the Norwegian government may reconsider its policy regarding foreign bases on its soil. Even if the Norwegians make only limited changes in their policy to the extent that they allow for the establishment of a Canadian base in Norway, this would allow Canada to fulfill this vital commitment more effectively than it has in the past.

Whether this will come to pass or not remains an open question, although there is some evidence, ambiguous though it may be, to suggest that it might become a possibility. In 1982, the Norwegian Journal of Military Science published the results of a survey it conducted through the Norwegian Marketing Data agency. [4] The results indicate that 85% of the survey

---

[3] For a brief but insightful discussion of the strategic environment with particular reference to Canada see, Bernard Thillaye, "Defence 81: The Strategic Environment for Canada", in B. MacDonald(ed.) op. cit., pp. 4-11.

[4] See M.S. Mortensen, "Attitudes Toward Military Defence in Norway", Armed Forces and Society, Vol.9 No.2, 1982. pp. 49-62.

group felt that it is important for Norway to possess a strong National Defence Establishment in order to prevent Norway from becoming involved in a war, and that 80% of the survey group felt it important that Norway's defence forces be attached to NATO. Unfortunately this particular survey did not raise the issue of Norwegian attitudes toward the possibility of opening foreign military bases on Norwegian territory. However, the results of several surveys on Norwegian attitudes to the pre-stocking of allied heavy military equipment in Norway are available. From September 1980 to January 1981, those in favour of pre-stocking rose as a percentage from 42% to 56%. [5] Whether this indicates that Norway may reconsider its policy on foreign bases and troops on its territory , however, is impossible to predict. What it does seem to indicate is that Norway is becoming more conscious of its vulnerable position along the Northern Flank and that adjustments may have to be made.

While the future of the strategic environment in the North remains unclear, it can be said with certainty that a Northern Base Option as part of Canada's commitment to the Northern Flank of NATO as discussed in this study is insufficient. Without intending to sound alarmist,

> ... the present problem [along the Northern Flank] is...

---

[5] See J.J. Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980's", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XVII, No. 4, 1982. p. 221.

> whether NATO is strong enough to keep intact the vital nerve of the Alliance to maintain control of the link between America and Europe... If the North Atlantic were no longer to fulfill this function of a link, then a vital element of the deterrence would be lost.[6]

To paraphrase Robert Weinland, although the next war may not be won along the Northern Flank, it may very well be lost there.[7] As the situation stands, Canada's commitment to the Northern Flank cannot be fulfilled. Moreover, a Northern Base Option as suggested by some Canadian defence analysts would do little to improve it.

One of the aims of this study has been to highlight the military significiance of the Northern Flank for NATO's security. While it is true that there is a major political element to the security equation of this region, in the final analysis, the ability to develop a credible military commitment remains paramount. Initially the CAST Group may have provided a viable military contribution, however, circumstances have changed to such an extent that it no longer does so. The options analyzed in this study, while addressing the political problem, do not serve to make the military contribution credible. This, in essence, remains the problem which Canadian and NATO defence planners must overcome if the security of the Northern Flank is to be ensured.

---

[6]Vice-Admiral R. Steinhous, cited in Leighton, op. cit., p. 94

[7]Robert Weinland, cited in Leighton, Ibid. , pp. 94-95.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS

Andren, Nils. The Future of the Nordic Balance. Stockholm: SSLP Ministry of Defence, 1977.

Bayliss, John et al. Contemporary Strategy. London: Croom Helm, 1975.

Bertram, C. and J. J. Holst (eds.). New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic. Guildford: IPC Press, 1977.

Clarkson, Stephen (ed.). An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968.

Cordier, Sherwood S. The Air and Sea Lanes of the North Atlantic. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981.

Cuthbertson, Brian. Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers. Don Mills: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1977.

Dobell, Peter C. Canada's Search for New Roles. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Dosman, E. J. (ed.). The Arctic in Question. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Gellner, John. Canada in NATO. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970.

Goebel, Hans. The Wrong Force for the Right Mission. Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, National Security Series No. 4/81, 1981.

Gray, Colin S. Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance. Toronto: Clarke Irwin & Co., 1972.

Griffiths Franklyn. A Northern Foreign Policy. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979.

Hill, Roger. Political Consultation in NATO, Wellesley Papers 6/1978. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1978.

Hill-Norton, Sir Peter. No Soft Options: The Politico-Military Realities of NATO. London: Hurst, 1978.

Holst, J. J. Five Roads to Nordic Security. Oslo: Universitetforlaget, 1973.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1981-82. London: IISS, 1981.

Jakobsen, Max. Finnish Neutrality. London: Hugh Evelyn Ltd., 1968.

Kaplan, Lawrence S. and Robert W. Clawson. NATO After Thirty Years. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981.

Leebaert, Derek (ed.). European Security: Prospects for the 1980's. Lexington: D. C. Heath & Co., 1979.

Leighton, Marian K. The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank. New York: National Strategy Information Centre, 1979.

MacDonald, Brian (ed.). Parliament and Defence Policy: Preparedness or Procrastination? Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982.

MacDonald, R. St. John (ed.). The Arctic Frontier. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966.

Miljan, Toivo. The Reluctant Europeans. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1977.

Morton, Desmond. Canada and War. Toronto: Butterworths, 1981.

Myers, Kenneth A. "North Atlantic Security: The Forgotten Flank?" The Washington Papers, Vol. VI, No. 62. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979.

_____. NATO - The Next Thirty Years. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980.

Nitze, Paul and Leonard Sullivan. Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.

Ørvik, Nils (ed.). Canada and NATO. Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, National Security Series No. 3/82. 1982.

_____. Canada's Northern Security: The Eastern Dimension. Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, National Security Series No. 2/82, 1982.

_____. Canadian Defence Policy: Choices and Directions. Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, National Security Series No. 2/80, 1980.

_____. "Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union," Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 6, September 1963. Cambridge, Mass.: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1963.

_____. (ed.). Report from Conference on Canada and the Northern Rim. Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, National Security Series No. 6/77, 1977.

Porter, Gerald. In Retreat: The Canadian Forces in the Trudeau Years. Ottawa: Deneau & Greenberg Publishers Ltd., 1978.

Tucker, Michael. Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980.

Yost, David S. NATO's Strategic Options: Arms Control and Defense. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981.

JOURNALS, PERIODICALS, NEWSPAPERS

Cox, David. "Canadian-American Military Relations: Some present trends and future possibilities," International Journal, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, Winter 1980-81.

Erickson, John. "The Northern Theatre: Soviet Capabilities and Concepts," Strategic Review, Summer 1976.

Farrar-Hockley, General Sir Anthony. "The Influence of the Northern Flank Upon the Mastery of the Seas," Naval War College Review, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, May/June 1982.

German, Robert K. "Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 1982.

Gilberg, Trond et al. "The Soviet Union and Northern Europe," Problems of Communism, Vol. 30, No. 2, March/April 1981.

Huitfeldt, Tonne. "A Strategic Perspective on the Arctic," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. IX, No. 3/4, 1974.

Ignatieff, George. "Canadian Foreign Policy in an Interdependent World," Spectrum, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1980.

_____. "In Self-defence," MacLeans, 21 April 1980.

_____. "NATO Thirty Years On - And what about Canada's role?" Draft of an address to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 12 October 1979.

_____. "Updating Canadian Security," Policy Options, Vol. 2, No. 4, September/October 1980.

Jacobsen, C. G. "Soviet Strategic Objectives for the 1980's," The World Today, Vol. 35, No. 4, April 1981.

Jockel, Joseph T. "Canada's Other Commitment to NATO: The defence of Norway," International Perspectives, January/February 1980.

Jockel, Joseph T. and Joel Sokolsky. "Emphasising the Assets: A Proposal for the Restructuring of Canada's Military Contribution to NATO," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2, Autumn 1979.

Lindsey, George. "A Useful New Role for the Canadian Forces in Europe," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, Summer 1974.

_____. "Strategic Aspects of the Polar Regions," Behind the Headlines, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, May 1977.

Lodgaard, Sverre and Nils Petter Gleditsch. "Norway - The Not So Reluctant Ally," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XXII, No. 4, 1977.

Maconochie, Alexander. "Across or Along: Soviet Amphibious Options in Northern Europe," United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, April 1980.

Ørvik, Nils. "A North Sea Alternative," Military Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, January 1967.

_____. "Soviet Approaches on NATO's Northern Flank," International Journal, Vol. XX, No. 1, Winter 1965-66.

Posen, Barry R. "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, Fall 1982.

Romaneski, Albert. "Norcic Blanace in the 1970's," United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, August 1973.

Sjaastad, Anders C. "Security Problems on the Northern Flank," The World Today, Vol. 35, No. 4, April 1979.

Sokolsky, Joel. "Canada's Future in NATO," United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, Vol. 106/1, January 1980.

Solem, Erik. "Energy and Changing Strategic Aspects of Canada's Arctic Resources," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3, Winter 1981-82.

Sullivan, Captain William K. "Soviet Strategy and NATO's Northern Flank," Naval War College Review, Vol. VXXII, No. 4, July/August 1979.

Wettern, Desmond. "NATO's Northern Flank," United States Naval Instutute, Proceedings, Vol. 95/797, July 1969.

Der Spiegel, 14 August 1978.

Edmonton Journal, 27 February 1980.

Edmonton Sun, 28 February 1980.

Ottawa Journal, 28 February 1980.

The Daily Gleaner, 16 September 1981.

The New York Times, 20 June 1977.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence Canada 1971. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972.

_____. Defence Canada 1972. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973.

_____. Defence Canada 1973. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974.

_____. Defence Canada 1974. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975.

_____. Defence Canada 1975. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976.

_____. Defence Canada 1976. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1977.

_____. Defence Canada 1977. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1978.

_____. Defence Canada 1978. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1979.

_____. Defence Canada 1979. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1980.

_____. Defence Canada 1980. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1981.

_____. Defence Canada 1981. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1982.

_____. Defence Canada 1982. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1983.

_____. Defence in the Seventies: White Paper on Defence. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971.

_____. Minister of National Defence, "Remarks by the Hon. Gilles Lamontagne to the Conference of Defence Association," 14 January 1982.

Canada, Senate, Subcommittee on National Defence, First Report. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1982.

_____. Proceedings of the Subcommittee on National Defence, Issues No. 1-35. Ottawa: Supply and Services.

Diubaldo, R. J. and S. J. Scheinberg. A Study of Canadian American Defence Policy (1945-75) - Northern Issues and Strategic Resources. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Extra-Nural Paper No. 6, 1978.

Jacobsen, C. G. Soviet Strategic Interests and Canada's Northern Security. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Extra-Mural Paper No. 4, 1978.

Nunn, Sam and Dewey F. Bartlett. NATO and the New Soviet Threat, Report to the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1977.

Tracy, Nicholas. Canada's Foreign Policy Objectives and Canadian Security Arrangements in the North. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Extra-Mural Paper No. 8, 1980.

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY
Department of National Defence
Operational Research and Analysis Establishment

2a. DOCUMENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

2b. GROUP

3. DOCUMENT TITLE
Canada's Commitment to NATO's Northern Flank: The Northern Base Option

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

5. AUTHOR(S) (Last name, first name, middle initial)
Robertson, William Scot

6. DOCUMENT DATE
December 1983

7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES
114

7b. NO. OF REFS

8a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO.

8b. CONTRACT NO.

9a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER(S)
ORAE Extra-Mural Paper No. 27

9b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO.(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this document)

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
Unlimited distribution

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12. SPONSORING ACTIVITY
ORAE

13. ABSTRACT

The security of NATO's Northern Flank has posed particular problems for the Western Alliance. Norway's cautious position within the Alliance has made it increasingly difficult for NATO to ensure the integrity of this vital region in the face of the enhanced Soviet military threat. If the Soviet Union is able to turn NATO's Northern Flank and interdict the North Atlantic sea lanes of communication which NATO must use to transport reserves of manpower and equipment to Europe, NATO may be placed in an extremely difficult position.

Canada has since 1964 and particularly since 1977, maintained a commitment to provide forces to act as a deterrent along the Northern Flank. Should deterrence fail, these Canadian forces are supposed to assist in defending the Northern Flank. Canada's capability to live up to this commitment is now in grave doubt. In response to this doubt, various defence analysts in Canada have suggested alternatives which may allow Canada to more effectively fulfill this commitment.

One group of analysts has recommended the establishment of a northern base in the Canadian Arctic for the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group (CAST). An alternative proposal envisages a CAST base in Northern Europe. Neither option is as credible as a base in Norway should this possibility become acceptable to a Norwegian Government.

DSIS
73-159

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

KEY WORDS

NATO's Northern Flank
Northern Base Option
Canada's Commitment
Soviet Threat
Norway

INSTRUCTIONS

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY: Enter the name and address of the organization issuing the document.

2a. DOCUMENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Enter the overall security classification of the document including special warning terms whenever applicable.

2b. GROUP: Enter security reclassification group number. The three groups are defined in Appendix 'M' of the DRB Security Regulations.

3. DOCUMENT TITLE: Enter the complete document title in all capital letters. Titles in all cases should be unclassified. If a sufficiently descriptive title cannot be selected without classification, show title classification with the usual one-capital-letter abbreviation in parentheses immediately following the title.

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES: Enter the category of document, e.g. technical report, technical note or technical letter. If appropriate, enter the type of document, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.

5. AUTHOR(S): Enter the name(s) of author(s) as shown on or in the document. Enter last name, first name, middle initial. If military, show rank. The name of the principal author is an absolute minimum requirement.

6. DOCUMENT DATE: Enter the date (month, year) of Establishment approval for publication of the document.

7a. TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES: The total page count should follow normal pagination procedures, i.e., enter the number of pages containing information.

7b. NUMBER OF REFERENCES: Enter the total number of references cited in the document.

8a. PROJECT OR GRANT NUMBER: If appropriate, enter the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written.

8b. CONTRACT NUMBER: If appropriate, enter the applicable number under which the document was written.

9a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER(S): Enter the official document number by which the document will be identified and controlled by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.

9b. OTHER DOCUMENT NUMBER(S): If the document has been assigned any other document numbers (either by the originator or by the sponsor), also enter this number(s).

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: Enter any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification, using standard statements such as:

(1) "Qualified requesters may obtain copies of this document from their defence documentation center."

(2) "Announcement and dissemination of this document is not authorized without prior approval from originating activity."

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: Use for additional explanatory notes.

12. SPONSORING ACTIVITY: Enter the name of the departmental project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development. Include address.

13. ABSTRACT: Enter an abstract giving a brief and factual summary of the document, even though it may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall end with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (TS), (S), (C), (R), or (U).

The length of the abstract should be limited to 20 single-spaced standard typewritten lines; 7½ inches long.

14. KEY WORDS: Key words are technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloging the document. Key words should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location, may be used as key words but will be followed by an indication of technical context.

POOR

QUALITY

ORIGINAL